1. Introduction

Christopher F. Zurn, Philosophy, University of Kentucky

The theory of recognition is now a well-established and mature research paradigm in philosophy, and it is both influential in, and influenced by, developments in other fields of the Geistes- and Sozialwissenschaften.\(^1\) It is constituted by a core set of concepts and assumptions, a series of well-defined substantive theses, relatively settled ways of approaching puzzles, and a set of focused disputes concerning particular claims and concepts. As a philosophical paradigm, of course, there is not the kind of deep consensus—on accepted techniques and methods, on solved versus outstanding puzzles, on settled background assumptions, and so on—that often characterize paradigms in the Naturwissenschaften. Nevertheless, the theory of recognition is currently generative of a wide variety of inquires and investigations in domains ranging over ontology and epistemology, moral and political philosophy, social theory, action theory, legal philosophy, philosophical anthropology, and the history of philosophy. This volume compromises a collection of papers by those working at the forefront of recognition theory and provides an unparalleled view of the depth and diversity of philosophical research on the topic. Its particular strength is to show the fruitfulness of interchange and dialogue between those

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\(^1\) The first three sections of this introduction incorporate, in significantly modified form, material first published as part of my “Schwerpunkt: Anerkennung,” a guest editor’s introduction to a special section on recognition, in the *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, Vol. 53, #3 (2005): 377-387. My thanks to Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch for very helpful comments on this version.
working from more historical sources and those working from contemporary sources. For we are convinced that progress in the philosophy of recognition will only be made through careful attention to the insights available from the past combined with scrupulous attention to both the specific character of contemporary debates in moral, social, and political philosophy and contemporary moral, social, and political life itself. To locate the papers presented in this collection, I would like to present an overview of the various historical roots of the current paradigm (1), articulate the current constellation in moral, political, and social philosophy that the theory of recognition can be seen as a response to (2), indicate how the paradigm addresses some of the specific problems faced in continuing the project of critical theory under current social conditions (3), before concluding with brief overviews of the individual contributions collected here (4).

(1) From a historical perspective, the theory of recognition has decipherable antecedents stretching back from the classical Greek understanding of friendship, to the reanimation of such themes in Renaissance humanism, on through the Enlightenment-era scrutiny of social passions rendered by various forms of sentiments theory, and culminating in Rousseau’s subtle accounts of the essential sociality of truly human nature. Despite this rich philosophical history, contemporary recognition theory has more frequently understood itself as rooted in German idealism, especially in the work of Fichte and Hegel concerning the ways in which structures of intersubjectivity are constitutively and regulatively related to the development of subjectivity. Hegel’s analysis—or rather, his various differing analyses—of intersubjective recognition in particular have been reworked and put to use by quite disparate traditions of philosophical, social scientific, and especially political thought over the course of two hundred years. Not all of these descendents explicitly employ the word ‘recognition’ and/or its cognates. But in a broad sense, one can see that they are employing a family of ideas, rooted in Hegel’s insights concerning the
irreplaceability of intersubjectivity for the human form of life, in order to redirect and reshape the fundamental questions of their respective disciplines and research traditions.

These insights were influentially taken up and reframed in Marx’s early analysis of the identity-constitutive character of our social relations in work contexts, and the deformations in those processes caused by the capitalist organization of productive relations. The exploration of such themes—especially the crucial concept of alienation—were central for the development of Western Marxism in the early decades of the 20th century. On this side of the Atlantic, and in quite different intellectual conditions, one can detect an inchoate but unmistakable imprint of British Hegelianism on the development of American pragmatism, particularly where it sought to develop employ socio-psychological evidence to support distinctly intersubjectivist theories of perception, knowledge, emotions, actions, socialization and the development of a sense of self. From a quite different direction, and with different theoretical aims in view, rethinking Hegel’s account of the master-slave dialectic inspired a generation of French phenomenologists to take up a series of questions concerning intersubjective recognition for the constitution of experience and knowledge. Hegel’s insights also had a decisive impact on the development of a phenomenologically-motivated theology attempting to rethink the structure of interpersonal relationships in terms of humans’ relationships with the divine. Finally, one must mention here the unmistakable import of the development of psychology as a discipline independent of philosophy, specifically the flowering of psychoanalysis, and the extension of its methods and ideas from therapeutic contexts into broader cultural formations.

After the end of World War II, the concept of recognition increasingly took center stage in some schools of psychoanalysis, centered around objects-relations theory, and in developmental psychology research, both of which stressed the centrality of early forms of intersubjectivity between primary care-takers and children. Philosophically, phenomenology in France in the post-war period increasingly turned towards themes of intersubjectivity as its
research domain was simultaneously expanded to include issues of ontogenesis, embodiment, and socio-political theory. In Germany, the recognition paradigm was not only reanimated through historically-oriented philosophical research on the crucial transformations in late 18\textsuperscript{th} and early 19\textsuperscript{th} century German idealism, but also had an indirect influence on the distinctive tradition of philosophical anthropology. Further impetus came from the specific way in which the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ in 20\textsuperscript{th} century analytic philosophy was taken up into a broader theory of linguistic intersubjectivity and the constitution of social life through communicative interactions in the theory of communicative action. Finally, two other intellectual streams descending from Hegelian insights became significant on both sides of the Atlantic. First, the interest among feminists, especially among second- and third-wave theorists, in overcoming androcentric forms of ontology, epistemology, and axiology motivated attention to the specific intersubjective and social conditions of identity formation that contribute to the maintenance of patriarchy. In particular, there was a strong desire for anthropological models that could be productively opposed to the intellectual, cultural, and socio-political legacies of masculinist idealizations of the individual—as atomistic, rational, self-aware, self-controlled, disembodied, and affect-free man—and could be employed by feminists in both philosophical and social scientific explanations, and the development of alternative normative systems of moral, political, and aesthetic value. Second, the socio-political challenges of comprehending and adequately responding to the fact of cultural and evaluative pluralism in modern complex societies led to the specific use of the concept of recognition as a way of thinking about what is legally and socially owed to different types of minority groups in multi-ethnic and multi-national polities. Productively drawing on these various streams, the theory of recognition has now come into its own as a scholarly framework, to a large part due to the integrative accomplishments of Axel Honneth’s theory.
(2) Turning now to current constellation in value theory, there are three main rival cognitivist paradigms, that is, paradigms that assert that some types of evaluative claims are justifiable to others in some more or less robust sense of ‘justifiable’: utilitarianism, Kantianism, and neo-Aristotelianism. In normative moral theory, broadly construed to include questions about what individuals owe to others and about how one ought to live, this constellation can be characterized in terms of three rival types of theory: consequentialism, deontology, and forms of virtue ethics such as the ethics of care or various forms of moral particularism and situationism. In normative political theory, the prevailing constellation has a somewhat different realization. Forms of consequentialism range here from economically focused theories such as welfare economics to theories of liberal perfectionism; Kantian theories are centered around the notion of justice with varying emphases on liberty, rights, equality, democracy, and the social contract; neo-Aristotelian themes have seen their greatest impact in political communitarianism.

As a moral theory, recognition theory seems most closely allied with neo-Aristotelianism. It focuses on the constitutive connection between social circumstances, Bildung, and the development of a good, or at least not deformed, life; it takes the development of a sense of personal identity as an irreducible element in moral life; it does not radically separate questions of moral motivation from those of justification; it stresses the central role of affect and emotion in moral life; it claims that moral theory cannot ignore the decisive import and role of commonly-shared horizons of value and meaning on moral identity; it turns its focus away from the philosophical search for a code of rules and principles that should be applied in the same way by all persons, and rather towards the cultivation of social forms of life that will promote healthy self-realization; and, it emphasizes the diversity of practical considerations relevant to individual action choices, the development of a plan of life, and the evaluation of organized social life.

Yet it is not indifferent to the concerns of consequentialism; even as it rejects the simple preference-aggregation models assumed in classical utilitarianism and welfare-economics, it
places central import, like liberal perfectionism, on the degree to which the broadest number of individuals are not denied the opportunity for rich forms of self-realization. More importantly still, recognition theory desires to retain some of the attractive features of Kantianism, in particular the claim to be able to explicate and justify normative standards of evaluation that are neither culturally nor socially contingent. It rejects the pure proceduralism of Kantian strategies for underwriting the universality of its normative claims, however, preferring to see them as grounded in the anthropologically-universal structural interconnection between forms of intersubjective life and individual development and self-realization. Further, it promises to be able to take seriously the meaning and value of individual rights and political democracy without the empty formalism that Kantianism often seems to be susceptible to, and without limiting practical considerations to the domain of moral duties and justice alone.

The distinctive aims of the theory of recognition arise from its integration of Hegel’s early analysis of intersubjective recognition, a moral phenomenology of experiences of disrespect, an account of the intersubjective conditions of ontogenesis drawing on both Mead and more recent work in objects-relations psychoanalysis, and, a theory of the intersubjective character of the justification of value claims. This then yields a morally-centered philosophical anthropology that can insightfully differentiate between three different forms of intersubjective recognition—stylized as love, respect, and esteem—their relation to the development of different forms of one’s relation-to-self, and the various types of social relations that promote or impede the development of a well-rounded and healthy personal identity.

But it is not merely as an account of moral life that the theory of recognition has shown its most promise. Rather it is precisely because that moral philosophy is systematically connected up with both explanatory and justificatory claims in political philosophy and in social theory that it has been found to be so fecund. From the perspective of normative political theory, recognition theory once again proposes an innovative combination of foci and theses that crosses
over traditional dividing lines between rival political theories. With neo-Kantianism, the philosophy of recognition endorses the way in which modern legal systems and structures of constitutional democracy safeguard individual autonomy through individual civil liberties and equal opportunities for political participation. Recognition theory gives a distinctive twist to the analysis of the institutions securing equal civic autonomy by understanding them as legal realizations of the intersubjective conditions required for self-respect, that is, those conditions of consociation necessary for persons to understand themselves as free and equal legal subjects and political citizens amongst other subjects and citizens. Yet in contrast to prevailing versions of neo-Kantianism, neither legal rights nor political democracy are justified in terms of a hypothetical social contract, but are rather understood as the outcomes of a historical struggles that can be rationally reconstructed: namely, social struggles that led to the gradual differentiation and specification of diverse forms of recognition. In particular, the social relations that generate differential esteem were gradually disconnected from kin structures and tied increasingly to individual accomplishment, at the same time as the bases of social esteem were separated out from the political and legal structures that were increasingly relied upon to secure equal respect among persons considered as autonomous. These various changes can be understood as developmentally progressive both with respect to the individualization of social esteem and the egalitarianization of social respect.

Like various forms of political consequentialism, recognition theory emphasizes the importance of promoting individual well-being, specifically in the sense of individual development. Yet the philosophy of recognition is more akin to capability approaches than to traditional welfare economics in rejecting aggregative measures of value and their typical operationalization in welfare metrics tied to simple revealed preferences or market prices. While, therefore, the justificatory structure of recognition theory is similar to liberal perfectionism or the capabilities approach to promoting freedom, its topical concerns are, once
again, broader than individual autonomy alone, comprising as well concerns for basic psychic integrity and qualitatively rich self-esteem. Because of these broader concerns, it has proven to be a paradigm particularly well-suited to analyzing political struggles over the extent of sex-specific injustices associated with the differential allocation of care responsibilities and unpaid household labor. In addition, as this volume demonstrates, much recent work in recognition theory has been concerned with rethinking the justificatory basis of the modern welfare state and exploring new and alternative conceptualizations of the interrelations between capitalist economic systems, redistributive state policies, and a society’s underlying principles and practices of productivity, merit, and remuneration.

As already intimated, in rejecting hypothetical contractarianism in favor of situated historical analyses of changing forms of life, the philosophy of recognition shares affinities with many of the methodological and analytic concerns of contemporary neo-Aristotelianism most evident in political communitarianism: the focus on a thoroughly social conception of the self; the concomitant emphasis on relatively thick conceptions of ethical life and competing horizons of value; the concern to broaden philosophical analysis beyond a liberal focus on individual rights and autonomy to encompass the political and social conditions of the good life and individual self-realization as well; the move away from philosophical justification in abstract terms drawn from pure practical reason and towards more substantive critique in terms of norms and ideals drawn immanently from existing forms of life; and so on. Accordingly, recognition theory has played a large role in some of the same debates where communitarianism has also been influential: struggles concerning the proper relations between religious understanding and state policies and forms of social organization and power, debates over multi-ethnic and multicultural policies and practices, and, expressions of critical concern about the excessive individualism fostered by leading institutions of modern life. Yet unlike communitarianism, and much more in tune with its intellectual roots in critical social theory, recognition theory has
never paid justificatory deference to that which is socially and historically given simply because it is so given. Neither extant groups, nor individual identities, nor traditions are immune to critical scrutiny; none are ‘self-authenticating sources of valid claims’ (to appropriate a phrase from Rawls, out of context). This can be seen in the distinctive twist recognition theory gives to debates over the priority of the right or the good. Preferring to move beyond the facial, first-order conflict between the proponents of liberal rights and those of collectively-shared goods, recognition theory draws on its Hegelian roots to show how the particular type of individual human agency—autonomous agency—that the laws and institutions of justice are designed to foster are themselves the results of distinctive practices of intersubjective socialization and recognition characteristic of modern societies. In this sense, the type of autonomous individuality that liberalism seeks to protect and foster is understood as a result of those historically-specific forms of intersubjective, ethical life that enable it to flourish in the first place.

Perhaps the most active area of research has not been in normative moral or political theory, but rather in normatively-informed, interdisciplinary social philosophy. Axel Honneth’s particular account of the connections between intersubjective recognition and social change is exemplary here, and generative of much subsequent work in the last decade. To put it very briefly, his account promises to be able to analyze many if not most of the central social struggles evinced in modern, complex, societies by demonstrating the internal connection between individual experiences of misrecognition and disrespect, and, the development of broader social struggles for expanded and more adequate social recognition. This has proved particularly productive in thinking about, for instance, not only the new social movements that are often denigrated under the label of ‘identity politics’, but also struggles on the part of subaltern and despised minority groups for expanded social, political, and cultural autonomy, and, in general, for conceptualizing how liberal societies and democratic constitutional states can
negotiate the difficult shoals between identity and difference, universalism and particularism, individuality and community. Finally, more recent work has also seen the extension of the recognition paradigm into a domain of questions it may have earlier seemed to be opposed to at the level of theory construction itself, insofar as its starting points for social analysis are practices of intersubjective regard rather than macrosocial structures and processes: namely, questions concerning the equitable distribution of income and wealth under capitalist conditions, struggles for the satisfaction of material interests, and, hence, class politics itself.

The ambitious socio-theoretic claim underlying this further development of the recognition paradigm is that we can understand the historical changes from traditional, to feudal, and to bourgeois-capitalist forms of social organization as the progressive differentiation of three recognition spheres according to their historically- and socially-specific institutionalization of three different principles of recognition. The intimate sphere of the family is first differentiated from a general public sphere according to the recognition principles of care and love, whereby the mutual recognition of persons is tailored to their particular affective, bodily, and conative needs. Subsequently, the feudal fusion of the legal status of persons with their pre-determined location in the estate order of society is split apart. On the one hand, a distinct sphere of legal rights and duties for persons qua legal subjects develops that enables the mutual recognition of subjects according to the universalized principle of equal respect. On the other hand, the differential esteem that was previously fused with one’s place in a naturalized status order is separated off from legal relations, and tied, rather, to the social recognition of one’s individual achievements. Specifically, bourgeois-capitalist forms of society connect the evaluation of one’s capabilities and accomplishments to a specific interpretation of the achievement principle: namely, that the appropriate degree of one’s merited esteem can be evaluated in terms of the differential evaluative scheme of the division of labor. Differential esteem recognition then is taken to simply track the quantitative market valuation of one’s monetary and remunerative
worth in the sphere of civil society. Needless to say, this appears to be an ideologically distorted interpretation of the achievement principle due to the specifically capitalist organization of the sphere of esteem. One’s capabilities and accomplishments are measured only according to economic metrics, and what gets counted as work, which forms of work are considered valuable, whose work is systematically denigrated, or worse, made invisible, and so on, are all largely dependent on asymmetrical and hierarchical relations of production.

(3) With such social-philosophical concerns, it is perhaps no surprise that the theory of recognition integrates well with the concerns of critical theory, that is, of an interdisciplinary social theory aiming to foster the emancipatory impulses it finds both explicitly and inchoately expressed in the very society it is analyzing. I believe that it is on this terrain that some of the most exciting—but also most unsettled and problematic—issues have recently arisen for recognition theory. Let me explain. In critical theory’s specific incarnations centered around the *Institut für Sozialforschung* in Frankfurt, there was always a more or less common and well-understood model of society presupposed by the various researchers, even if it operated only tacitly and in the background. For the first generation of critical theorists, this social model was supplied by the analysis of capitalism that, having its deepest roots in Marx, had taken on the specific form we now call ‘Western Marxism’ by incorporating the refinements and insights of Lukács and especially Weber.

In the second generation of critical theory—paradigmatically in the work of Jürgen Habermas—the preferred social model was explicitly developed out of a propitious arrangement of sociological functionalism (via Parsons and Luhmann), tempered by a Weberian theory of modernization as rationalization, and combined finally with an action theory based in the insights of pragmatism and analytic philosophy into the reproductive and integrative capacities of linguistic interaction. Combined with a proceduralist account of moral and political justification that proposed to reinterpret Kantian practical reason in intersubjectivist terms, this led ultimately
to a focus on the formal features of morality, democracy, law, and official political systems. But these transformations, in turn, seemed to lead critical theory ever farther away from some of its historically distinctive concerns, and more towards technical philosophical and methodological concerns about the form and grounds of rationality, on the one hand, and formal normative theories of political justice and democracy that seemed, as it were, relatively ‘de-socialized’, on the other. What had become of the great critical areas of interest of the past: the phenomenal changes in cultural life through the industrialized mass media and new communications technology, the transformations of personality structures, the nature and role of ideology in the maintenance of structures of domination and oppression? What had become of the leading social concepts imbued with emancipatory content: alienation, anomie, commodification, reification, ideological naturalization, propagandized culture, the authoritarian personality, surplus repression, social fragmentation and diremption, inchoate forms of socially-rooted suffering, and so on? In short, what happened to the focus on forms of social life that caused distorted and distorting forms of subjectivity and intersubjectivity—what happened to the focus on social pathologies? Some of these developments are surely explainable in terms of the variable personal interests of researchers and the interaction of those interests with changing social conditions. But is seems plausible to say in addition, that much of the loss of confidence in the old research domains and social concepts stemmed from a loss of confidence in a single, shared, and unified explanatory framework for understanding social transformations and their effects on various social groups.

Some of the original impetus and much of the early success of the recognition paradigm, I believe, stemmed from dissatisfactions with then-current models of social conflict and the social groups that expressed and carried on those conflicts. The older tradition of critical theory had, of course, already experienced significant problems in this area. Given that the commonly shared Marxist-inspired social model focused on the economic sphere as the central and defining
locus of social conflict, and that it thereby looked almost exclusively to class struggles as the site
of socially progressive struggles, the demise of the revolutionary power of workers’ movements
and activities in the consolidation of liberal capitalism before, and especially after, World War II
led to theoretical conundrums and practical uncertainties for a theory always oriented towards
social emancipation. The upheavals of the 1960’s and their aftermath in the formation of new
social movements—not to mention the resilience and adaptability of the capitalist form of
productive relations—indicated deep problems in the shared socio-theoretic assumptions. The
first generation of critical theory had already been forced to face the fact that class struggles
could not be confidently counted on to forward emancipatory hopes and actions. Yet now, in
addition to these disappointments, new social movements for liberation—anti-colonial, anti-
racist, anti-patriarchal, anti-heteronormative—had identified social problems not obviously
related to the ravages of capitalist modernization, and pointed to a hitherto unnoticed landscape
of socio-moral concerns and normative claims. Unfortunately, the second generation critical-
theoretic marriage of functionalism and hermeneutics, though theoretically sophisticated and
highly developed, led again to a set of social diagnoses that seemed insufficient to ‘grasping the
struggles and wishes of the age in thought.’ To put a complex claim about the second generation
analysis briefly, the attempt to connect the theoretical hypothesis of ‘colonization effects’ to the
formation, concerns, and aims of the new social movements seemed unsatisfactory: both as an
explanatory account of the rise and import of these new forms of social struggle and contestation,
and as a critical-theoretic thesis that could illuminate the character of current social problems for
social movement participants themselves.

The theory of recognition, by contrast, presents an account that articulates a
straightforward connection between individual experiences of suffering and their social causes,
an account, furthermore that also explains the current prominence of many different actual social
struggles: not only those for the expansion of the content and application of legal rights and
entitlements, but also those for non-dominating forms of personal life, as well as those for a socio-cultural environment free from denigration and discrimination. Equally important, the recognition paradigm promises to systematically connect these socio-theoretic analyses to a convincing normative account of the justificatory claims made in such struggles, and articulates a differentiated set of normative standards for judging the cogency and worth of particular claims. Finally, it also promises to make good on a crucial desideratum of critical theory: to articulate an interdisciplinary social theory whose emancipatory impulses are located immanently in the actual world of extant social relations, but which can be refined, through the help of conceptual and theoretical clarification, into insights that can then be reflexively employed by society’s members in order to identify and overcome pathological social arrangements and relations. By this systematic constellation of moral theory, social theory, and political analysis, then, the theory of recognition reanimates the tradition of a critical diagnosis of the social pathologies of the present—a tradition already present, in nuce, in Hegel’s original hints that a theory of intersubjective struggles for recognition could be useful as a diagnostic lens on the simultaneously progressive and painful processes of modernization.

(4) The fourteen papers collected in this volume take up the philosophy of recognition and its manifold themes and puzzles by approaching them from both historical and contemporary perspectives. Although one might think that the two-part division of the volume reflects two different philosophical methodologies—one a form of history of ideas and the other a form of problem-based analysis—we hope that the individual selections belie any such facile division of philosophical labor. For in fact, as the following brief overview of the papers will reveal, the philosophy of recognition takes real inspiration from the history of reflection upon recognition and allied concepts, even as the careful study of that history reveals unsurpassable insights for contemporary theory formation. Contemporary work helps to bring insight into hitherto unnoticed nuance and subtly in historical texts, even as careful study of historical texts can yield
claims and arguments crucial for contemporary discussions. As the selections in this volume show, the best work in the philosophy of recognition occurs precisely where the two perspectives meet and fruitfully interact. And this dialectical interaction is crucial to the ongoing viability of recognition theory as a research paradigm. As basic challenges are posed to the paradigm by both historical and contemporary arguments, its strength is measured, in part, by the extent to which it can productively integrate and adapt to puzzles and problems, rather than allowing them to pile up as unaddressed anomalies. The papers collected here, we believe, demonstrate that the theory of recognition is a robust paradigm. Even if the recognition paradigm calls for further internal development and refinement, these papers show that it is not yet time for revolutionary theory change.

The volume open with Frederick Neuhouser’s investigation of Rousseau’s account of *amour propre* as the essential human drive for recognition. Although recognition theory often looks to German idealism for its origins, it is in fact Rousseau who is the first to place the struggle for recognition at the very center of human life and so also as a fundamental concern for moral, political, and social philosophy. By giving a comprehensive account of Rousseau’s theory of *amour propre*—explaining exactly what kind of a passion it is, how it can be at the root of the many evils of the human condition, how those evils can be ameliorated through education and through specific social and political arrangements, and how the very development of human reason is dependent upon *amour propre*—Neuhouser suggests that much of the following work on recognition through the 19th and 20th centuries can be productively regarded as ‘essentially a series of footnotes to Rousseau.’ Of particular interest, he shows that whereas previous thinkers had regarded the desire for regard from others as little more than a troublesome manifestation of human vanity, Rousseau saw both its destructive and constructive characteristics. Insofar as *amour propre* is not only malleable in the light of education and particular social conditions but also interacts with other social arrangements such as levels of inequality and status disparities,
Rousseau viewed it an essential precondition for both spiraling competitions for symbolic emphera and for the development of practical reason’s capacity to adopt the viewpoint of the generalized other and thereby enter into the normative space of reasons. According to Rousseau’s theory, then, even as some of the most destructive aspects of ‘civilization’ itself can be traced to the core human drive for recognition, that drive is nevertheless one requisite component that must be employed to arrange moral and political life in ways that can overcome the tendency of the drive toward producing evils.

In his piece, Jay Bernstein argues that Fichte develops the first conception of rights as forms of, or modes of, intersubjective recognition. Insofar as recognition—and by implication, having a right—is a matter of how one stands in relations to others, in how one is taken and treated by those others, in having a certain normative status in a social world, recognition (and rights) appears to be paradigmatic versions of idealism: one’s being recognized as a person with rights is essentially mind-dependent. Of course, in opposition to Kant’s transcendental idealism, the idealizations involved in Fichte’s account of recognition are located in the concrete practices of social communities rather than the solitary acts of consciousness of abstract individuals. The question is then raised for Fichte’s account, as it is for all forms of idealism: is the idealist price for securing normativity, even cognitive idealism, too high, is such a mind-dependent account doomed to tearing human beings away from their natural context, from their evolutionary setting, from the thick materiality of their everyday existence? Bernstein argues that Fichte attempted to close this gap between idealism and materialism by arguing that intersubjective recognition is essentially tied to our physical embodiment. Detailing the insights and curiosities of Fichte’s cognitive account of rights and embodiment, Bernstein both shows some of the limitations of Fichte’s approach and indicates its potential fecundity for contemporary theories of recognition.

Michael Quante offers a new interpretation of one of the most famous passages of the Phenomenology of Spirit: Hegel’s analysis of self-consciousness and its development in the
master-slave dialectic. Quante focuses on the relation between “self-consciousness,” “spirit,” and “recognition” and carefully elucidates the specific claims and arguments Hegel advances in that section of the Phenomenology. Focusing on Hegel’s famous characterization of spirit as the “I that is we, and the we that is I,” Quante shows that Hegel’s claim that self-consciousness itself is socially constituted does not thereby entail a ‘totalitarian’ overwhelming of subjectivity by the social. If it is interpreted in strictly ontological terms, rather than attempting to bring in ethical concerns, so Quante argues, Hegel’s conception of self-consciousness, spirit, and recognition can be shown to be of great interest for contemporary action theory and philosophy of mind. Quante makes this case by showing that Hegel’s arguments in support of the social constitution of self-consciousness and human actions anticipate central insights of contemporary analytic philosophers such as Jaegwon Kim and Alvin Goldman.

Of course, Hegel’s account of recognition has been important not only with respect to ontological issues, but also with respect to broad swaths of practical philosophy. In his article, Ludwig Siep considers whether in fact a principle of recognition can serve as the central principle of ethical thought. In order to do this, he analyzes some of the central differences between Fichte’s and Hegel’s respective accounts, and then offers a typology of contemporary recognition theories. He shows that contemporary theories focused on relations of mutual respect between free and equal autonomous agents take their inspiration from Kant and Fichte. He argues that although this type of theory has important insights, it cannot offer a principle broad enough to gauge the rationality of all recognitive social relations and institutions. Turning to a second contemporary strand of recognition theory that focuses on individual identity and the constitution of individuality, Siep argues that although it is inspired by Hegel, it does not have a sufficiently capacious account of the relations between individuals and social entities such as families, communities, and polities. A third strand concerned with the recognition of distinct cultures in multicultural societies is also inspired by Hegel but, with the loss of faith in Hegelian
or Christian teleology, a principle of recognition can no longer provide us with the resources for reconciling ourselves with history. In conclusion Siep presents a number of important considerations to show that, even as a principle of recognition can serve as one of the central ethical principles for modern life, given the importance of questions concerning the relation of humans to the nature in contemporary ethical thought—concerning everything from ecology to genetic engineering—recognition theory cannot provide all of the conceptual tools we need today to come to terms with the ethical dilemmas we face.

In his “Recognition, the Right, and the Good” Terry Pinkard takes on the pressing question of the priority of the right over the good endorsed by Kant and contemporaries influenced by him, by exploring the relationship between intersubjective recognition and the good. Pinkard contends that recognition is not just one good among others, or even a condition for the realization of some other goods, but is rather itself world-disclosing and constitutive of human agency. He explores three central theses advanced by Hegel and argues that they give the most convincing answers to contemporary questions in action theory, the philosophy of mind, and social philosophy. First, Hegel’s dialectical metaphysics of agency can be understood by seeing that, although agency is a normative matter of responding appropriately to reasons, what counts as responding appropriately is itself socially constituted through social practices. For instance, even as we perceive goods in the world which spur us to action, those goods can themselves become the objects of practical reflection and thereby can be transformed into new goods to be perceived and responded to in the world. Second, goods are essentially social facts which are instituted and sustained by social relations of recognition. Social recognition practices thus not only disclose the world of what is worthwhile and best for us, they are also constitutive of our practical agency insofar as we orient our actions to those goods. Third, if our social practices of recognition do not institute and sustain appropriate goods, then recognition is experienced as alienating rather than reconciliatory. Recognition, on Pinkard’s reading then, is
important from the point of view not only of human agency but also of the prospects for being at home in the modern world.

In his contribution, Daniel Brudney argues that the 1844 Marx had a specific conception of a well-ordered society, and shows how the true communist society Marx then envisioned is essentially bound up with a specific social recognition practice that could sustain the self-worth of its members. Communist self-realization is self-realization through others, that is, through a specific practice of social recognition of individuals’ productive activities. However, in contrast to most accounts of recognition that historically have focused on respect-based recognition, Marx (like Mill and others in the sentimentalist tradition) focuses on concern-based recognition. Hence one central part of the paper is devoted to explicating precisely what kind of concern-based recognition Marx envisioned, explaining how that set of recognition practices could fundamentally transform individuals’ senses of themselves and their places in a community, and considering whether that form of recognition is up to the task Marx set for it of overcoming the alienating effects of socially-enforced egotism. Another central aim of the paper is evaluating various objections that might be brought to Marx’s vision of the true communist societies by challenging the conceptual and practical sustainability of Marx’s envisioned extended concern for all humanity that is the centerpiece of well-ordered recognition practices. Brudney argues that, correctly understood, a concern-based recognition practice is neither conceptually nor practically impossible, thus recasting Marx’s envisioned new communist society and its individual members as realistic utopian visions of a well-ordered society that must be gauged alongside other such visions of well-ordered societies, such as those like liberalism founded in respect-based recognition. The paper concludes with some considerations about the relative sustainability of less than well-ordered respect-recognition and concern-recognition societies.

Andreas Wildt investigates the degree to which a proper psychoanalytic understanding of the concept and import of recognition integrates well with the philosophically and critical-
1. Zurn: Introduction

theoretically articulated recognition paradigm. Drawing on a conceptual inventory of the various uses of the concept of recognition in Freud, in psychoanalysts following in the tradition of Melanie Klein, and in more recent objects-relations theorists such as Donald Winnicott and Jessica Benjamin, Wildt proposes to clarify the issues by distinguishing between two different senses of recognition. What he calls ‘propositional recognition’ concerns the developing child’s cognitive and conative acknowledgement of, and affective coming to terms with, the propositional content, as it were, of the painful facts of relational life: namely, that the child is fundamentally dependent on the mother, but that she is independent of the child. By contrast, ‘personal recognition’ concerns the positive affirmation of another person in light of their individual interests, capabilities, achievements, and rights, where this form of intersubjectivity is capable of becoming fully reciprocal. He supports the thesis that propositional recognition has genetic and conceptual priority over personal recognition on a number of different grounds both within and across the various psychoanalytic discussions of recognition. Wildt also shows how his theses concerning the relation between propositional and personal forms of recognition have important, and potentially destabilizing, consequences for the account of ontogenesis presupposed in the regnant paradigm of recognition employed in current philosophical and socio-theoretic debates.

Nancy Fraser’s “Rethinking Recognition” defines one focal theme for contemporary recognition theory (and for several chapters of this volume): how exactly are we conceive of the relationships between social and political recognition struggles, on the one hand, and economic systems and the justice of their distributive outcomes, on the other hand? While Fraser agrees with recognition theory that there is an important justice component in many recent struggles for the recognition of cultural differences, she worries at the same time that the focus on recognition threatens to displace or even eclipse the traditional grammar of emancipatory movements for distributive justice. In an age of globalizing capital markets and increasing economic inequality
both within the populations of nations and across the globe, Fraser worries that recognition theory has neither the conceptual nor normative tools necessary to address the distributive injustice. Furthermore, to the extent that recognition theory appears to encourage not only patently emancipatory struggles for cultural acceptance but also downright reprehensible movements based in culturalistic and xenophobic chauvinism, Fraser contends that a focus on identity and the politics of difference threatens to simplify, reify, and so artificially solidify group identities. Thus, even as social recognition may be a necessity in a multicultural world, it also threatens to encourage separatism, intolerance, patriarchalism, and authoritarianism. Fraser argues that contemporary theories of recognition should turn toward a status-based rather than identity-based model in order to combat the problem of reification, and that it should forego monistic ambitions to be a comprehensive account of social relations in favor of a multi-modal analysis that analytically separates the cultural dynamics of recognition from the economic dynamics of redistribution.

As one of the leading contemporary theorists of recognition, Axel Honneth rejects Fraser’s preference for separating out a functionalist account of economic dynamics from an hermeneutic account of the normative infrastructure of recognition relations. In his article here, Honneth is concerned to render the concept of meaningful, secure, and emancipatory work more than a mere utopian ought in the face of what many intellectuals regard as the obdurate reality of a globalized capitalist labor market. For even as economic transformations have rendered work, and especially wage labor, ever less dependable, well-paid, safe, and available, the world of work still retains primacy in the social lifeworld—both in the organization of everyday life and as the center piece of identity formation. This essay proposes a new conception of the category of societal labor for the purposes of critical theory. In particular, it shows first how certain normative demands concerning work can be understood through a form of immanent critique that highlights the way in which such demands are rational claims embedded in the structures of
social reproduction. It also argues that a critical theory of the contemporary world of work
cannot be based in a romantic universalization of the ideal of organic, holistic craftspersons, even
as it must go beyond the limits of functionalist accounts of the economy to explore the moral
infrastructure of the modern organization of work. Second, it shows how societal labor can
operate as an immanent norm only if it is understood in terms of the conditions of recognition
obtaining in modern exchange relations. Finally, when the market is conceptualized from the
point of view of social integration rather than system integration, the connection between work
and recognition is shown to give rise to a robust normative conception of the division of labor,
thereby providing a substantive reservoir of moral principles for the evaluation and
transformation of contemporary social life.

Emmanuel Renault’s explores similar terrain concerning the relationship between
recognition theory and the economy in his piece through an exploration of whether and how
Honneth’s philosophy of recognition can be understood as renewing the initial program of
critical theory elaborated in the 1930’s by Max Horkheimer. Yet because the original term
‘critical theory’ referred only euphemistically to Marxism, Renault contends that the
controversial question of the relationship between the theory of recognition and the initial
program of critical theory can only be solved by solving the problem of the former’s relation to
Marx. The paper analyzes several of the key components of the theory of recognition in order to
assess the degree to which it is capable of renewing the critical tasks laid out by Marx by means
of its own socio-theoretic framework. It focuses on questions concerning 1) whether the proper
role of the theory is as normative philosophy or as social theory, 2) the specific conception of
social struggle employed, 3) the analysis of and interrelations between interpersonal interactions,
institutions, and social structures, especially as they relate to the explanation of capitalism and of
social evolution, and 4) the relations between different historical diagnoses and specific critiques
of contemporary society evinced in competing models of contemporary social theory inspired by
Marx. In the end, Renault contends that recognition theory can save the proper inheritance of critical theory—that is, as an interdisciplinary theory that intends to transform the abstract questions of political philosophy into issues best addressed by a materialist social theory—but only if it seriously combines its critical acumen to a comprehensive social theory more convincing than either original Marxism or the theory of communicative action.

Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch contends that the best way to carry forward a simultaneous analysis and critique of contemporary capitalism is in fact a suitably tailored recognition theory. He supports this by first outlining the basic contours of Honneth’s recognition theory, reconstructing the criticisms it has received (most prominently from Nancy Fraser) concerning its analysis of capitalism, and then showing how careful attention to the relationship between social esteem and economic activities can allay these criticisms while simultaneously giving more convincing answers to pressing socio-theoretic questions. In particular, Schmidt am Busch argues that theory must carefully distinguish between different sense of social esteem, self-esteem, and their particular relationships to one’s economically-relevant work if critical theory is to accurately explain how current practices of meritocratic esteem lead to endless striving for wealth and professional success, conspicuous consumption, and the decline in support for the social welfare functions of the state. With such explanations, however, the supposed need for a separate functionalist account of the economy is obviated, and the way is cleared for developing a rich, recognition-based analysis and critique of capitalism, one best based, so Schmidt am Busch urges, on Hegel’s original analysis of capitalist markets.

In his contribution, Jean-Philippe Déranty also argues that Fraser-style critiques of recognition-theoretic approaches political economy miss their mark, though he attempts this defense from a different direction. Going right at the allegedly greatest weakness of recognition theory—its attempt to employ a moral, psychological concept of recognition to explain the sources of distributive injustice—Déranty first reconstructs the criticisms before arguing that it is
only the sensitive hermeneutical apparatus of recognition theory that can properly detect social pathologies at the level, and in the grammar within which, they are experienced in the everyday lifeworld by those who suffer from the depredations of economic injustice. While this ‘critique through experience’ shows recognition theory possesses greater critical acumen for detecting social pathologies than that provided by alternative functionalist accounts of economic phenomena, it does not yet show the explanatory advantages of the former. For purposes of explanation, Déanty suggest that contemporary forms of unorthodox political economy including institutionalism and especially regulatory theory have important overlaps with recognition theory and thus hold out the promise of integrating recognitive forms of social theory with economic theory. With the prospect of such an integration, critical theory need not settle for a bifurcated analysis that separates off the moral from the economic and that, at least tacitly, concedes that contemporary capitalist markets constitute a relatively norm-free block of social reality resistant to emancipatory transformation.

The last two articles turn back to fundamental problems in ontology, action theory, moral psychology, and ethics by giving careful analyses of acts of recognition themselves. In his contribution, Arto Laitinen sets out to make sense of exactly what counts as an object of recognition, who can count as a recognizer, who or what can count as an object of recognition, and, what the proper scope is for features that may be responded to through recognition. This analysis is accomplished in the light of the basic insight of recognition theory: namely, that recognition matters to individuals and in social life precisely because recognition has an important connection to individuals’ practical self-relations, in particular to their individuals’ sense-of-self. However, Laitinen detects a tension that has arisen in recognition theory between those who focus on one of two distinct insights. On the one hand, some stress that successful acts of recognition occur when a recognizer properly responds to some normatively relevant features of an object, such that successful recognition can go forward without any normatively governed
reciprocity on the part of that which is recognized—Laitinen calls this the ‘adequate regard’
intuition. On the other hand, some stress that successful acts of interpersonal recognition can
only go through when the recipient of recognition has certain capacities, in particular, capacities
for recognizing the recognizer as a competent recognizer—Laitinen calls this the ‘mutuality
insight’. Because both insights have good reasons to support them, and since emphasizing only
one of them would unduly restrict the scope of phenomena captured by a theory of recognition,
Laitinen suggests that we need a two-part account that distinguishes between two sense
corresponding to each. While admitting that it is a rather technical terminology, he recommends
that we use the terms ‘recognizing/being recognized’ for the one-way sense of adequate regard
and the terms ‘getting recognition/giving recognition’ for the reciprocal sense of inter-personal
mutuality.

Heikki Ikäheimo aims at an analytic account of recognition that can systematically
connect themes from different philosophical traditions and different areas of philosophy. He
argues in general that we ought to conceive of recognition in terms of ‘practical attitudes of
taking something/someone as a person.’ Such a conception is intended to capture the main thrust
behind talk of ‘recognition’—as different as the substance of that talk might be—that is found in
contemporary critical social theory and in contemporary Hegel scholarship. He claims that his
account is both broad enough to capture the various themes broached in these literatures under a
unified, holistic conception of recognition. He also argues that this concept can also unify the
various discussions about recognition in different areas of philosophy: in ontology, philosophical
anthropology and action theory, as well as in ethical, political and social theory. The strategy
here is to show how recognition is constitutive of various aspects of full-fledged personhood, on
the one hand, and is (perhaps) the fundamental factor concerning evaluative judgments of
actions, persons, interpersonal relations, and socio-political institutions. Ikäheimo concludes by
connecting his analysis of recognition to the idea that social recognition is the motor of
progressive history. In the end, he aims to show that the philosophy of recognition aims at a holistic philosophical picture of social life that is both ontologically accurate and critically insightful.