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# The Architectonic of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*

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After the virulent criticisms of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and much of the analytic tradition, systematic philosophy has for the most part gone into eclipse in contemporary European thought.<sup>1</sup> The main target of these criticisms was often the daunting edifice of the Hegelian system which dominated so much of Nineteenth Century philosophy. Despite a small handful of scholars who try with might and main to salvage this edifice,<sup>2</sup> the general belief among scholars today is that at bottom Hegel's philosophical project as a system is simply bankrupt and indefensible all around.<sup>3</sup> Of all the texts in the Hegelian corpus, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* with its plethora of themes and troubled composition has been in particular singled out for criticism as a disunified and unsystematic text.<sup>4</sup> Typical of this general belief is Kaufmann's characterization: "the *Phenomenology* is certainly *unwissenschaftlich*, undisciplined, arbitrary, full of digressions, not a monument to the austerity of the intellectual conscience and to carefulness and precision but a wild, bold, un-

<sup>1</sup> The question of the possibility of a systematic philosophy today formed the topic of the International Hegel Conference in 1975. Henrich, Dieter (ed.), *Ist systematische Philosophie möglich? Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 17, Bonn: Bouvier, 1977.

<sup>2</sup> E.g., Léonard, André, "La structure du système hégélian," *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, (69), 1971, pp. 495–524. Trede, Johann Heinrich, "Phänomenologie und Logik. Zu den Grundlagen einer Diskussion," *Hegel-Studien*, (10), 1975, pp. 173–210.

<sup>3</sup> Even as great of an admirer of Hegel as John Dewey writes, "The form, the schematism, of his [sc. Hegel's] system now seems to me artificial to the last degree." Dewey, John, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in *Contemporary American Philosophy*, volume II, edited by George P. Adams and W. P. Montague. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1930, p. 21.

<sup>4</sup> Haering, Theodore, "Entstehungsgeschichte der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*," in *Verhandlungen des III. Internationalen Hegel Kongresses 1933*, edited by B. Wigersma. Haarlem: N/VH. D. Tjeenk Willink & Zn. and Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1934, pp. 118–36. Also see Haering, Theodore, *Hegel sein Wollen und sein Werk II*. Leipzig and Berlin: Teubner, 1929, pp. 479ff. Pöggeler, Otto, "Die Komposition der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*," in *Hegel-Tage Royaumont 1964. Beiträge zur Phänomenologie des Geistes*, edited by Hans-Georg Gadamer. *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 3, Bonn: Bouvier, 1966, pp. 27–74. Cited from the reprint in *Materialien zu Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*, edited by Hans Friedrich Fulda and Dieter Henrich. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1973, pp. 329–90.

precedented book.”<sup>5</sup> The *Phenomenology* is thus seen simply as an eclectic and at times bizarre collection of atomic analyses on sundry topics. This pre-conception of the *Phenomenology* as a disunified text then leads to a pre-determined and, in my view, erroneous interpretive approach.

The strategy of a number of specialists, who have found Hegel’s system so impenetrable in its overall architectonic and so problematic at its particular transitions, has been simply to give up entirely on his project as a system and to approach his philosophy in an episodic manner. With this interpretive method one tries to understand individual sections of the *Phenomenology* in abstraction from the systematic contexts in which they appear. This seems intuitive enough since the contexts of Hegel’s analyses are so varied that it is often difficult to imagine what could be the schematic connection between them in any case. This leads many scholars to try to exploit the isolated sections and analyses of the *Phenomenology* for their own purposes. Pöggeler expresses this tendency with the following rhetorical questions: “Should we not simply keep to the things that the *Phenomenology* offers as positive results—for example, concerning physiognomy or the Roman world? Should we not, when possible, exploit Hegel’s work as was done in the Middle Ages when people went to ancient buildings in search of construction materials for their own structures without any regard or consideration given to their disparate forms?”<sup>6</sup> In this way the commentator can make Hegel topical by showing how the individual issues that the philosopher treats are similar to contemporary problem constellations, thus emphasizing, for example, Hegel’s philosophy of action,<sup>7</sup> his philosophy of language<sup>8</sup> or his account of demonstratives.<sup>9</sup> Scholars of this persuasion try to explicate these sections out of context as containing interesting and relevant issues in themselves. In this way, it appears these commentators can save Hegel from himself, given that his system appears so hopeless. However, this strategy of selection and

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<sup>5</sup> Kaufmann, Walter, *Hegel: A Reinterpretation*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978, p. 158. Cf. “The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is a profoundly incongruous book” (ibid. p. 142). “I should prefer to speak of charades: now a tableau, now a skit, now a brief oration” (ibid. p. 127). Elsewhere, Kaufmann writes in a similar vein, “One really has to put on blinkers and immerse oneself in carefully selected microscopic details to avoid the discovery that the *Phenomenology* is in fact an utterly unscientific and unrigorous work.” Kaufmann, Walter, “Hegel’s Conception of Phenomenology,” in *Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding*, edited by Edo Pivcevic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 229.

<sup>6</sup> Pöggeler, Otto, “Die Komposition der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*,” in *Materialien zu Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*, op. cit., p. 372. (My translation.)

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Stepelevich, L. S. and Lamb, David (ed.), *Hegel’s Philosophy of Action*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1983.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Lamb, David, “Hegel and Wittgenstein on Language and Sense-Certainty,” *Clio*, (7), 1978, pp. 281–301.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Plumer, Gilbert, “Hegel on Singular Demonstrative Reference,” *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, (11), 1980, pp. 71–94.

omission, although attractive to modern scholars bent ever more toward specialization, is seriously misguided since Hegel himself, like the rest of the German idealists before him,<sup>10</sup> expressly insisted on the systematic nature of philosophy as an intellectual enterprise.

Hegel believed that truth could only be expressed in terms of a system, and he explains this in numerous places, insisting that the particular parts of the system are meaningful only inside the systematic context in which they appear. "Apart from their interdependence and organic union," he writes, "the truths of philosophy are valueless, and must then be treated as baseless hypotheses, or personal convictions" (EL §14; Enz p. 41).<sup>11</sup> A truth in a philosophical system has its truth value only in relation to the other members of the system, and an atomic thesis asserted without relation to a wider system cannot rely on such a system to provide a context and thus to support it since apart from such a system it stands without relation to other concepts and theories which give it meaning in the first place.<sup>12</sup> For example, a tile in a mosaic seen on its own in abstraction from the other tiles of which the mosaic is composed is in a sense meaningless, i.e. one could not divine the picture of the mosaic as a whole with knowledge of the single tile alone. The tile has its true meaning only in its relation to the rest of the tiles and to the mosaic as a whole. Likewise in philosophy, according to Hegel, the truth and meaning of the individual propositions depend upon the context in which they are found in the system as a whole. I take this to be the point of the well-known passage in the Preface of the *Phenomenology* where Hegel claims, "The True is the whole" (PhS §20; PhG p. 19).<sup>13</sup> In other words, whatever truth there is in the individual claims of a system lies in the organic

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<sup>10</sup> Kant, for instance, is by no means less energetic in his insistence on systematic philosophy than Hegel: "As a systematic unity is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of science, that is, makes a system out of a mere aggregate of knowledge, architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific in our knowledge, and therefore necessarily forms part of the doctrine of method." Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by N. Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1929, A832/B860. Cf. "For pure speculative reason has a structure wherein everything is an organ, the whole being for the sake of all others.... Any attempt to change even the smallest part at once gives rise to contradictions, not merely in the system, but in human reason in general." Kant, *ibid.*, Bxxxvii-xxxviii. Cf. also Kant, *ibid.*, A840/B869.

<sup>11</sup> EL = *Hegel's Logic. Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, translated by William Wallace. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975; Enz = *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, vol. 19 of *Gesammelte Werke*, edited by the Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968ff.

<sup>12</sup> See Pöggeler, Otto, *Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Freiburg and Munich: Karl Alber, 1973, pp. 121–22.

<sup>13</sup> (PhS = *Phenomenology of Spirit*, translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977; PhG = *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, vol. 9 of *Gesammelte Werke*, edited by the Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968ff.) Cf. EL §16; Enz pp. 41–42.

or systematic relation of those claims to one another inside the whole of the system. In the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, Hegel says of the absolute Idea, “The science of this Idea must form a system.... Truth, then, is only possible as a universe or totality of thought.... Unless it is a system, a philosophy is not a scientific production” (EL §14; Enz p. 41).<sup>14</sup> As we can see from these passages, Hegel is quite forthcoming with respect to the relation of truth to a systematic philosophy. The notion of a philosophical system is not something that one aspires to attain merely for the sake of some mild aesthetic pleasure gained from a certain order or symmetry or from the satisfaction won by being able to pigeon hole sundry concepts under orderly headings, but rather it is, according to Hegel’s holism, essentially bound up with the very notion of truth itself.

If truth can only be expressed in the form of a philosophical system, then we do Hegel a disservice by randomly excerpting parts of his system which we find interesting and relevant to our contemporary philosophical agenda while ignoring the role they play in the system as a whole. This approach misunderstands the spirit of Hegel’s systematic enterprise and dismisses his own clear statements of explanation and intention in this regard. By excerpting individual analyses out of their systematic context, we lose the very meaning of those analyses. If we are going to talk about Hegel at all, we must also talk about the Hegelian system. Although perhaps we will not be able to understand the most opaque parts of the Hegelian architectonic, it is more advisable, given Hegel’s conception of philosophy, simply to admit this up front than to give up on it, and Hegel with it, altogether.<sup>15</sup>

One of the central interpretive challenges of the book as a whole is in a sense posed by what Hegel says about the *Phenomenology* in a letter to Schelling. There he claims that the work contains an intricate “interlacing of cross-references back and forth”<sup>16</sup> that he unfortunately was unable to make as

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<sup>14</sup> Cf. also in the Preface of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel flatly claims, “The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of such truth” (PhS §5; PhG p. 11). Cf. also a little later in the Preface where he says, “knowledge is only actual, and can only be expounded, as Science or as *system*” (PhS §24; PhG p. 21).

<sup>15</sup> I would not wish to claim that my emphasis on Hegel’s philosophy as a system is entirely unique or novel. Cf. Puntel, L. Bruno, *Darstellung, Methode und Struktur. Untersuchung zur Einheit der systematischen Philosophie G. W. F. Hegels*. Bonn: Bouvier, 1973. Escaraffel, Frederic, “Des mouvements parallèles dans la *Phénoménologie de l’esprit*,” *L’Arc*, (38), 1969, pp. 93–105. Kimmerle, Gerd, *Sein und Selbst. Untersuchung zur kategorialen Einheit von Vernunft und Geist in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Bonn: Bouvier, 1978. Lamb, David, *Hegel: From Foundation to System*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980. Labarrière, Pierre-Jean, *Structures et mouvement dialectique dans la Phénoménologie de l’esprit de Hegel*. Paris: Aubier, 1968. Westphal, Merold, *History and Truth in Hegel’s Phenomenology*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1979.

<sup>16</sup> Hegel to Schelling [95], Bamberg, May 1, 1807, Letters, p. 80; Briefe I, pp. 159–62. (Letters = *Hegel: The Letters*, translated by Clark Butler and Christian Seiler. Bloom-

clear as he would have liked. It seems to me then that one of the appropriate tasks of the secondary literature on the *Phenomenology* is to try to uncover these cross-references and by so doing to uncover the hidden structure of the work as a whole. In this essay, I would like to attempt to reconstruct the systematic structure of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* with respect to its formal unity. Of course, in an investigation of this kind, this can amount to little more than a sketch since a full-length commentary would be required to demonstrate the systematic connections one by one. However, although this analysis will serve only as a general outline, this is in itself not a negligible service since, as I have indicated, Hegel's systematic pretensions, especially in the *Phenomenology*, have long been subject to attack, and thus a study which could indicate how this part of his system might be at least plausible would be valuable in its own right. Since my principal aim is to demonstrate the unity of form in the *Phenomenology*, I will not be able in my discussion to offer more than the most cursory account of the unitary movement of the *contents* of the individual sections and chapters. Moreover, I will not treat the biographical questions concerning the turbulent composition of the *Phenomenology* since this too would require a study in itself. In order to establish the unity of form, some scholars have attempted to read the *Phenomenology* by transposing the structure of Hegel's *Logic* onto it.<sup>17</sup> These attempts, however, blur the systematic relation between the two works by collapsing them into a single project. Instead, my strategy for establishing the unity of the text will be to take as a model the revised version of the table of contents that Hegel wrote after the completion of the work and then to test this organizational scheme against a number of passages throughout the *Phenomenology* that serve as indicators for the systematic structure as a whole. These passages, I wish to argue, when pursued consistently, will lead us to a picture of the general economy of the text which contains parallel chapters and sections as Hegel indicated in his letter to Schelling. In my account, I will linger somewhat on the "Reason" chapter since it, in my view, holds the key to the structure of the work as a whole. An understanding of this hitherto neglected structure, it is hoped, will in turn help us better to understand this difficult text as it was originally intended to be understood by allowing us to place the individual analyses in their proper context. By uncovering this structure, we will also be in a position to criticize the "patchwork" interpreta-

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ington: Indiana University Press, 1984; Briefe = *Briefe von und an Hegel*, edited by Johannes Hoffmeister, 4 vols. Hamburg: Meiner, 1961.)

- <sup>17</sup> Notably, Heinrichs, Johannes, *Die Logik der Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Bonn: Bouvier, 1974. Léonard, André, "Pour une exégèse renouvelée de la 'Phénoménologie de l'esprit' de Hegel," *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, (74), 1976, pp. 572-93. Léonard, André, "La structure du système hégélian," *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, (69), 1971, pp. 495-524. Albizu, Edgardo, "La estructura de la *Fenomenología del espíritu* de Hegel y el problema del tiempo," *Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía*, (7), 1981, pp. 209-22.

tions that are so inimical to Hegel's own expressed methodology and conception of philosophy.

### I. The Table of Contents

The first major difficulty with respect to the systematic unity of the work concerns the table of contents. When one critically examines the outline indicated there, one will notice straightaway the rather confusing mixture of Latin letters and Roman numerals, sufficient to discourage the most intrepid interpreter who wishes to insist on the systematicity of the work. The story of how this confused table of contents came about is not a simple one. When Hegel first wrote the *Phenomenology*, he used the Roman numerals for the sections "Sense-Certainty," "Perception," "Force and the Understanding," "The Truth of Self-Certainty," "The Certainty and Truth of Reason," "Spirit," "Religion" and finally "Absolute Knowing." This first scheme can thus be represented as follows:

#### The First Scheme

|                                      |                                       |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| I. Sense-Certainty                   | VI. Spirit                            |
| II. Perception                       | A. The True Spirit. The Ethical Order |
| III. Force and the Understanding     | B. Self-Alienated Spirit. Culture     |
| IV. The Truth of Self-Certainty      | C. Spirit that is Certain of Itself.  |
| A. Lordship and Bondage              | Morality                              |
| B. Freedom of Self-Consciousness     | VII. Religion                         |
| V. The Certainty and Truth of Reason | A. Natural Religion                   |
| A. Observing Reason                  | B. Religion in the Form of Art        |
| B. The Actualization of Rational     | C. The Revealed Religion              |
| Self-Consciousness Through           | VIII. Absolute Knowing                |
| its own Activity                     |                                       |
| C. Individuality which takes itself  |                                       |
| to be Real in and for itself         |                                       |

This organizational scheme has caused a great deal of confusion concerning the disproportionate lengths of these sections, some of which include as few as nine pages in the English translation (i.e. "Sense-Certainty") while others contain as many as one hundred and forty-six (i.e. "Spirit"). Hegel, however, revised this table of contents in a very illuminating way when he was reading the proofs for the book.<sup>18</sup> In the second scheme he used the Latin letters A., B., and C. for the "Consciousness," "Self-Consciousness" and "Reason" chapters respectively, (and thus, it is due to this change that the argument arises that the original plan for the work consisted of only three chapters). At

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<sup>18</sup> See the Suhrkamp edition of the *Phenomenology* for a detailed account of these changes. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Werke 3. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986, pp. 595ff. See also the "Nachwort" to the Hoffmeister edition (G. W. F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Hamburg: Meiner, 1952), "Zur Feststellung des Textes," pp. 575–78. Also see Pöggeler, Otto, "Die Komposition der



that time he also affixed the double letters AA., BB., CC., and DD. to “Reason,” “Spirit,” “Religion” and “Absolute Knowing” respectively. Thus, the second plan for the work appears as follows:

### The Second Scheme

|  |                                       |
|--|---------------------------------------|
| A. Consciousness   | (BB.) Spirit                          |
| B. Self-Consciousness  | A. The True Spirit. The Ethical Order |
| C. (AA.) Reason  | B. Self-Alienated Spirit. Culture     |
| A. Observing Reason  | C. Spirit that is Certain of Itself.  |
| B. The Actualization of Rational<br>Self-Consciousness Through<br>its own Activity | Morality                              |
| C. Individuality which takes itself<br>to be Real in and for itself                | (CC.) Religion                        |
|  | A. Natural Religion                   |
|  | B. Religion in the Form of Art        |
|  | C. The Revealed Religion              |
|  | (DD.) Absolute Knowing                |

The confusion about the table of contents stems from the fact that the various editions of the *Phenomenology* in German, as well as the English translations, have combined these two organizational schemes instead of opting for the one or the other.<sup>19</sup> The result is an extremely confusing mixture of Latin letters, both single and double, and Roman numerals. This, however, is simply a problem with the editing of Hegel’s text and not with its intrinsic structure.

The key argument that this change gives rise to is that Hegel changed his mind about the structure of the work during its composition and was compelled to revise the table of contents as a result of the change.<sup>20</sup> Thus, according to this view the text must be disunified since it compresses two different organizational schemes into one. This argument is perhaps valid enough when applied to the editors of the *Phenomenology* who combined the two versions of the table of contents into one, but it amounts to a simple *non sequitur* when it is applied to Hegel’s text itself. Simply from the fact the Hegel changed his mind about the structure of the text and subsequently revised the table of contents in accordance with that change, it does not follow that the text itself is disunified. Nothing here necessarily excludes the possibility that he was able to incorporate the first scheme adequately into the

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*Phänomenologie des Geistes*,” op. cit. Kähler, Klaus and Marx, Werner, *Die Vernunft in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1992, pp. 13ff.

<sup>19</sup> I see it as misguided that Labarrière takes both of these versions together in his attempt to reconstruct the unitary structure of the text. Labarrière, Pierre-Jean, “La *Phénoménologie de l’esprit* comme discours systématique: histoire, religion et science,” *Hegel-Studien*, (9), 1974, pp. 143ff.

<sup>20</sup> This is of course the thesis of Haering and Pöggeler. Cf. also Kaufmann, Walter, *Hegel: A Reinterpretation*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978, pp. 133–36. Esp. : “The table of contents bears out that the work was not planned painstakingly before it was written, that Parts V and VI (Reason and Spirit) grew far beyond the bounds originally contemplated and that Hegel himself was a little confused about what he had actually got when he was finished” (ibid. p. 135).



second, which he then represented in the revised table of contents. The most this argument can establish is that due to the perceived need for revision in the table of contents on Hegel's part, there *may be reason to suspect* that there is a discontinuity in the text, but in order ultimately to prove this, one must examine the arguments of the text itself.

In my view, the changes that Hegel made in his revised version of the table of contents are in fact quite helpful. When we regard the ultimate organizational scheme as authoritative, since after all it represents his considered opinion, then we have a fairly clear outline of the structure of the work itself which corresponds to its internal argumentation. What then makes this simple change so illuminating? As I will argue below in more detail, what Hegel means to indicate with the single letters of the second version is a set of parallel structures; thus, "Consciousness" and "Self-Consciousness" are meant to run their course in a fashion parallel to one another. On the other hand, what he indicates with the double letters is that the dialectic is to return to the beginning; thus, "Reason," "Spirit" and "Religion" return to the same starting point that we saw in "Consciousness" and work through the same material again under different aspects in accordance with the sphere that each governs. The important point for our purposes is that Hegel's revision of the table of contents is a welcome aid to those searching for a key to the systematic unity of the work. In the following, I wish to test this thesis in a very general way against the actual analyses of the *Phenomenology* and in a more detailed fashion against Hegel's own explicit statements about the systematic structure of the work. I will thus briefly work through the text of the *Phenomenology* section by section with an eye toward the nature of the relationships of the various chapters and sections to one another.

## II. Consciousness

Hegel begins the *Phenomenology* with his account of "Consciousness" which consists of three discrete conceptions of objectivity all sharing the fundamental realist belief in an independently existing external world of objects which are ontologically prior to human subjects and their capacity to know. The analyses of "Sense-Certainty," "Perception" and "Force and the Understanding" represent attempts to demonstrate that objects are simply given as predetermined entities. The "Consciousness" chapter thus concerns above all the object sphere or what Hegel refers to as the "in-itself." The challenge in the "Consciousness" chapter is to give a complete account of the determination of objectivity with reference to the object sphere alone; however, in the course of the dialectic this conception proves to be inadequate and collapses under the weight of its own internal contradictions. What consciousness learns is that even in its most basic attempts to conceive of an object as, for example, a thing with properties or an unseen force behind the appearances, there are certain universal concepts involved which are not, strictly speaking,

to be found in the empirical manifold or in the object sphere. These concepts can only be accounted for by an appeal to the human capacity for thought, and thus the human subject is drawn into what was originally an attempt to think the object as an independent ontological entity. As a necessary presupposition for the determination of objectivity, the subject sphere must be taken into account as well. This then leads us to the “for-itself” sphere of “Self-Consciousness” where the categories are reversed and the self-conscious subject is given ontological priority, with the world of objects thought to be dependent on it. These two units “Consciousness” and “Self-Consciousness” run parallel to one another in their respective spheres of in-itself and for-itself. The analyses in the “Consciousness” chapter that are given with respect to individual objects are then in “Self-Consciousness” reapplied to the self-conscious subject.

### III. Self-Consciousness

The structure of the “Self-Consciousness” chapter is somewhat problematic. Its appearance in the table of contents displays straightaway a certain asymmetry. Whereas Hegel in the rest of the book orders his chapters into three sections, here we seem to have only two, “A. Lordship and Bondage” and “B. Freedom of Self-Consciousness,” both of which apparently fall under the heading of “IV. The Truth of Self-Certainty.” Because of this asymmetry, there is some confusion about the status of the section “The Truth of Self-Certainty.” Does it encompass the entire “Self-Consciousness” chapter since it is the only heading with Roman numerals or is it a simple introduction to the chapter which officially begins with “Lordship and Bondage”? This typical understanding of the problem, however, once again rests upon an interpretation that combines the two versions of the table of contents. But when we concentrate only on the second version, the problem becomes less acute. First the “Self-Consciousness” chapter, referred to with the letter B., seems unproblematically to follow the “Consciousness” chapter, which bears the letter A., without any further commentary about the organization or division of the contents of the chapter. Now what are we to make of the question of the structure of “Self-Consciousness”? My thesis is that the material that precedes the “Lordship and Bondage” section,<sup>21</sup> which according to some interpretations is only introductory,<sup>22</sup> is in fact expected to do philosophical work and thus is not merely intended as an introduction. Specifically, I wish to argue that this section, in fact, forms the first argumentative step in the “Self-Consciousness” chapter and that it represents the first of a three-step argument that is complemented by “Lordship and Bondage” and “Freedom of

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<sup>21</sup> I.e., PhS §§166–77; PhG pp. 103–9.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Solomon, Robert C., *In the Spirit of Hegel*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 401: “It should be seriously questioned whether these first pages are really a distinct form of consciousness at all.”

Self-Consciousness.”<sup>23</sup> I will refer to this material for the sake of simplicity as the “The Truth of Self-Certainty,” although originally this title was apparently intended to cover the dialectical movements of “Lordship and Bondage” and the “Freedom of Self-Consciousness” as well. Thus, I propose to read the “Self-Consciousness” chapter as containing the following structure: “1. The Truth of Self-Certainty” (PhS §§166–77), “2. Lordship and Bondage” (PhS §§178–96), and “3. Freedom of Self-Consciousness” (PhS §§197–230).

There are three important arguments that speak in favor of this view and against the thesis that “The Truth of Self-Certainty” constitutes only introductory material or forms something distinct from the course of the argumentation of the rest of the “Self-Consciousness” chapter. First, when Hegel reworked the same material in the *Encyclopaedia*, he removed the apparent asymmetry in the “Self-Consciousness” chapter and used the material that I am calling “The Truth of Self-Certainty” as the first part of a three-step argument in precisely the way I have indicated above. In the *Philosophy of Mind*,<sup>24</sup> which constitutes part three of the *Encyclopaedia*, the “Self-Consciousness” chapter is organized as follows:

B) Self-Consciousness

- α) Appetite
- β) Self-Consciousness Recognitive
- γ) Universal Self-Consciousness

From the contents of this chapter it is clear that “α) Appetite” corresponds to “The Truth of Self-Certainty” where the key term is “desire.” It is likewise obvious that “β) Self-Consciousness Recognitive” corresponds to “Lordship and Bondage,” where the key category is recognition (*Anerkennung*), and finally that “γ) Universal Self-Consciousness” corresponds to “Freedom of Self-Consciousness.”

Second, in addition to Hegel’s account of “Self-Consciousness” in the *Encyclopaedia*, we also have his analysis from *The Philosophical Propaedeutic*, written during Hegel’s Nuremberg period from 1808 to 1811, shortly after the *Phenomenology*. “Self-Consciousness,” according to the discussion there, likewise contains three different moments:

Self-Consciousness has, in its formative development or movement, three stages:

- (1) Of *Desire* in so far as it is directed to other things;

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<sup>23</sup> This view is also held by, among others, Escaraffel. Cf. Escaraffel, Frederic, “Des mouvements parallèles dans la *Phénoménologie de l’esprit*,” *L’Arc*, (38), 1969, pp. 93–105.

<sup>24</sup> In English as *Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind*, translated by William Wallace and A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.

- (2) Of the relation of *Master and Slave* in so far as it is directed to another self-consciousness unlike itself;
- (3) Of the *Universal Self-Consciousness* which recognizes itself in other self-consciousnesses and is identical with them as they are identical with it.<sup>25</sup>

The course of his discussion there likewise leaves no ambiguity about the fact that the material preceding the “Lordship and Bondage” dialectic in the *Phenomenology* corresponds to the first stage, i.e. that of “desire,” in the *Propaedeutic*.

The third argument that speaks against the thesis that the material preceding “Lordship and Bondage” forms only an introductory section concerns the subject matter of the section itself. When we examine the text closely, we see that the argument here parallels the argument that was given in “Sense-Certainty,” the first section of the “Consciousness” chapter. In “Sense-Certainty” we are concerned with the pure being of the object, which at the beginning of “Self-Consciousness” becomes reinterpreted as the pure being of the subject. Moreover, “Lordship and Bondage” parallels the “Perception” section in a similar fashion. In “Perception” a second object is introduced, and the categories of identity and difference become relevant for the determination of objectivity. So also in “Lordship and Bondage” we see a second self-consciousness introduced for the first time which forms a standard for comparison and contrast for the other, and it is this standard which then serves to determine the self-conscious subject. Finally, the “Freedom of Self-Consciousness” parallels the “Force and Understanding” section.<sup>26</sup> Instead of forces operating behind the scenes causing the world of experience to appear as in “Force and the Understanding,” in the “Unhappy Consciousness” section it is a self-con-

<sup>25</sup> Hegel, *The Philosophical Propaedeutic*, translated by A. V. Miller, edited by Michael George and Andrew Vincent. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 59–60; *Hegel Werke*, vol. 4, *Nürnberg und Heidelberger Schriften 1808–1817*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986, p. 117.

<sup>26</sup> I have argued separately for this last parallelism in the following article: “Die Rolle des unglücklichen Bewußtseins in Hegels *Phänomenologie des Geistes*,” *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, (39), 1991, pp. 12–21. Although he interprets it somewhat differently than I, Bonsiepen also points out this parallelism between the Unhappy Consciousness and Force and Understanding: “The opposition between the sensible and the supersensible world, between the here and the beyond in the ‘Force and Understanding’ chapter corresponds to the relation between the individual and the Unchangeable.” Bonsiepen, Wolfgang, *Der Begriff der Negativität in den Jenaer Schriften Hegels. Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 16, Bonn: Bouvier, 1977, p. 160. This parallelism is, however, overlooked by Burbidge who would instead see the section entitled “Legal Status” from the “Spirit” chapter as re-examining the material from the “Freedom of Self-Consciousness.” Burbidge, John, “Unhappy Consciousness in Hegel—An Analysis of Medieval Catholicism?” *Mosaic*, (11), 1978, esp. pp. 71–72.

scious other, God or what Hegel calls “the Unchangeable,”<sup>27</sup> which constitutes the otherworldly reality which is responsible for the mutable mundane sphere. This structural parallelism between the two chapters indicates that this material at the beginning of “Self-Consciousness” is intended as an independent argument in its own right just as “Sense-Certainty” was an independent argument at the earlier stage.

The task of the “Self-Consciousness” chapter is to fulfill the original goal—to give a complete account of objectivity—but this time with reference to the subject sphere. This too proves to be inadequate since, as we learn in the dialectic of the “Unhappy Consciousness,” the self-conscious subject there operates with the conception that it is an isolated atomic entity. The dialectic, however, shows that self-consciousness is in fact ontologically bound up with other self-conscious subjects. Thus, an account of the interaction of one self-consciousness with other self-conscious subjects must be given in a way that demonstrates how the social whole serves to shape the determination of objectivity in the course of this dialectical interaction among self-conscious subjects. This is the task of the “Reason” chapter.

#### IV. Reason

The structure of “Reason” is somewhat problematic due to its inordinate length, which seems to set it apart from the “Consciousness” and “Self-Consciousness” chapters.<sup>28</sup> However, this length is only troublesome if we consider the “Reason” chapter as a whole to correspond to “Consciousness” and “Self-Consciousness” respectively as seems to be indicated by Hegel’s first table of contents. If, on the other hand, we see “Reason” as going back to the beginning of the dialectic and working through the same material as “Consciousness” and “Self-Consciousness” at a higher conceptual level, then the problem disappears since “Reason” would then correspond to “Consciousness” and “Self-Consciousness” *taken together* and not as individ-

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<sup>27</sup> PhS §208; PhG p. 122. Hegel uses the same language to refer to God in the *Philosophy of Right*. See PR §270 Remark; RP p. 350: “It is for this reason that in religion there lies the place where man is always assured of finding a consciousness of the unchangeable, of the highest freedom and satisfaction, even within all the mutability of the world and despite the frustrations of his aims and the loss of his interests and possessions.” (PR = *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, translated by T. M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952; RP = *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse*, vol. 7 of *Sämtliche Werke*. Jubiläumsausgabe in 20 Bden, edited by Hermann Glockner. Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1927–1940.)

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Hoffmeister, Johannes, “Einleitung des Herausgebers,” in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke, Kritische Ausgabe*, Band 11, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1937, p. xxxv. Cf. also Haering, Theodore, “Entstehungsgeschichte der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*,” in *Verhandlungen des III. Internationalen Hegel Kongresses 1933*, edited by B. Wigersma, op. cit., pp. 129ff. Cf. also Solomon, Robert C., “The *Phenomenology of Spirit*: Its Structure,” in his *The Spirit of Hegel*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, esp. p. 213.

ual units. Evidence for this interpretation of the structure of the work can be seen in the double letters AA. which precede “Reason” in the second version of the table of contents. The key question here is what the single and the double letters in the revised version are supposed to indicate about the structure of the text. In my view, which I think is supported by the text internally by virtue of the corresponding arguments in the relevant chapters, the single and double letters are meant to indicate the parallelisms among the various parts of the text. “Consciousness” and “Self-Consciousness” are meant to form independent units that build upon one another (hence the A. and B.). Then comes “Reason” which also forms a substantive independent unit (hence the C.), but yet here something is different. By inserting the AA. in front of the “Reason” chapter, Hegel means to indicate that the dialectic at this point goes back to the original position in the “Consciousness” chapter (represented by A.) and works through the same forms of consciousness again but at a different level. Likewise “Spirit” and “Religion,” which are also represented with double letters (BB. and CC.), return to the beginning of the cycle as well and work through each of the figures again under their own aspect. Thus, we see that “Reason” is meant to return to the beginning of the so-called highway of despair, i.e. to “Consciousness.” The three sections of the “Reason” chapter also have the single letters A., B., and C. and thus seem to correspond to the single letters A. and B. of “Consciousness” and “Self-Consciousness” respectively. This reading renders the following structure<sup>29</sup>:

|                   |                       |   |
|-------------------|-----------------------|---|
|                   |                       | [AA. Reason]  |
| in-itself         | A. Consciousness      | A. Observing Reason   |
| for-itself        | B. Self-Consciousness | B. The Actualization of<br>Rational Self-Conscious-<br>ness through its own Activ-<br>ity |
| in-and-for-itself |                       | C. Individuality which takes<br>itself to be real in and for<br>itself                    |

The final section of “Reason,” which has no previous parallel, would then bring the dialectic to a close by uniting subject and object, in-itself and for-itself.

At the end of his account of “Observing Reason,” Hegel relates two results of the dialectic examined in that section. His comments there seem to

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<sup>29</sup> Cf. Solomon who has a glimmering of this structure which he orders according to categories of theory and practice. Solomon, Robert, *In the Spirit of Hegel*, op. cit., p. 218. Cf. Escaraffel who seems to follow these parallelism but who in my view somewhat confuses the in-itself, for-itself and in-and-for-itself moments. Escaraffel, Frederic, “Des mouvements parallèles dans la *Phénoménologie de l’esprit*,” *L’Arc*, (38), 1969, esp. p. 98.

give evidence for this thesis about the structure of “Reason,” i.e. that the “Reason” chapter is intended in a sense to go back to the beginning of the dialectic and to repeat at a higher level the dialectic of “Consciousness.” Hegel says precisely this, explaining that “Reason” “is a completion of the outcome of the preceding movement of self-consciousness. The Unhappy Self-Consciousness renounced its independence, and struggled to make its *being-for-self* into a *Thing*. It thereby reverted from self-consciousness to consciousness, i.e. to the consciousness for which the object is something which merely *is*, a *Thing*; but here, what is a *Thing* is self-consciousness” (PhS §344; PhG pp. 190–91). Here Hegel says expressly that the Unhappy Consciousness at the conclusion of the “Self-Consciousness” chapter reverts “from self-consciousness to consciousness,” and it is at this point that the “Reason” chapter begins. Thus, the first section of the “Reason” chapter, “Observing Reason,” returns to a treatment of the object sphere and precisely in this respect overlaps with the “Consciousness” chapter.

When seen in this light, the apparently disproportionate length of the “Reason” chapter begins to make sense. This chapter must be longer than the “Consciousness” and the “Self-Consciousness” chapters since it is intended to work through the same material found there, and, in addition, it even adds a third section which is supposed to complete the sequence. When we see that “Consciousness” is supposed to correspond to “Observing Reason” and not to the entire “Reason” chapter, then the disparity in length becomes nominal.

A further parallelism with the preceding chapters can be seen predictably enough with respect to Reason’s relation to its object.<sup>30</sup> Here the issue is the *certainty* of Reason, and this is the key to our comparison with “Consciousness” and “Self-Consciousness.” In the first section of the “Consciousness” chapter, natural consciousness thought that it had sense-*certainty*, i.e. it thought that what was immediately given as a propertyless “This” was true and thus was the object of certainty. In the first section of the “Self-Consciousness” chapter, we saw a new sort of certainty arise, i.e. the truth of *self-certainty*. Here natural consciousness, after realizing that it played the crucial role in the account of the determination of the subject-object Notion, deemed itself the true and the certain, whereas whatever was other than the self it considered non-being and something inessential. The analysis thus moves from the objective to the subjective realm between these two chapters. Here in the “Reason” chapter, Hegel explains this relation between “Consciousness” and “Self-Consciousness” as follows:

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<sup>30</sup> See Flay, Joseph C., “The History of Philosophy and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*,” in *Hegel and the History of Philosophy. Proceedings of the 1972 Hegel Society of America Conference*, edited by Joseph O’Malley, Keith W. Algozin, Frederic G. Weiss. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, pp. 52ff.



There appeared two aspects, one after the other: one in which the essence or the True had for consciousness the determinateness of *being*, the other in which it had the determinateness of being only *for consciousness*. But the two reduced themselves to a single truth, viz. that what *is*, or the in-itself, only *is* in so far as it is *for* consciousness, and what is *for* consciousness is also *in itself* or has *intrinsic* being. (PhS §233; PhG p. 133)

The first aspect mentioned in this passage is, of course, “Consciousness,” and the second “Self-Consciousness,” which come together in the third, i.e. “Reason.” Now here at the level of “Reason” we are concerned with the *certainty* of Reason. Reason then constitutes the in-and-for-itself moment which will ultimately bring both subject and object together.

### A. Observing Reason

The general structure that I have sketched so far is made even more precise by Hegel’s introductory comments at the beginning of the individual sections of “Reason.” In the first of these, he gives us a clear explanation of the way in which the section, “Observing Reason,” is intended to fit with what has come before. He writes, “Since Reason is all reality in the sense of the abstract ‘mine’ and the ‘other’ is for it something indifferent and extraneous, what is here made explicit is that kind of knowing of an ‘other’ by Reason, which we met with in the form of ‘meaning,’ ‘perceiving’ and the ‘understanding,’ which apprehends what is ‘meant’ and what is ‘perceived’” (PhS §238; PhG p. 136). Here Hegel indicates with his reference to “meaning,” “perceiving” and the “understanding” that the dialectical movements that we have examined from the “Consciousness” chapter, i.e. “Sense-Certainty,” “Perception,” and “Force and the Understanding” will be repeated here at a higher level, i.e. at the level of “Reason.” Thus, “Observing Reason” will correspond as a whole to the “Consciousness” chapter while its three sections will correspond to the individual sections of the “Consciousness” chapter.<sup>31</sup> Using this as a guide, we end up with the following parallelisms:

#### A. Consciousness

1. Sense-Certainty
2. Perception
3. Force and Understanding

#### A. Observing Reason

1. Observation of Nature
2. Observation of Self-Consciousness in its Purity and in its Relation to External Actuality
3. Observation of Self-Consciousness in its Relation to its Immediate Actuality

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<sup>31</sup> Cf. Findlay, John, *Hegel: A Re-Examination*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958, p. 102: “In the treatment of Observation which follows Hegel retraces at a higher level some of the ground covered in his previous study of Sense-Certainty, Perception and Scientific Understanding.” See also Taylor, Charles, *Hegel*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 162.

However, “Observing Reason” is no mere repetition of the “Consciousness” chapter; despite this important similarity and parallelism, there is also an important difference. Although emphasis is still placed on the object sphere as in “Consciousness,” this time the self-conscious subject is not considered atomic. Rather it is the group which is important in the determination of objectivity. Hegel expresses this as follows: “Reason appeals to the *self-consciousness* of each and every consciousness” (PhS §234; PhG p. 134). With respect to natural scientific inquiry, the individual with his own characteristics and idiosyncrasies is not what is important. A scientific experiment must in principle be able to be carried out by a universal subject, and in this sense science is impersonal. Hence, at the level of “Reason,” the subject-object Notion is socially determined by a group whose members are parts of a larger social whole, whereas in “Self-Consciousness,” for example, it is precisely the isolated individual who determines truth.

### *B. The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through Its Own Activity*

Hegel in the introductory paragraphs to this section<sup>32</sup> gives us a fairly thorough discussion of the structure of the “Reason” chapter. Here he summarizes the movement from “Consciousness” to “Self-Consciousness” as well as the movement from “Observing Reason” to the next stage, “The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through Its Own Activity.” His comments are instructive in helping us with our reconstruction of the structure of the text. He writes,

The *pure* category, which is present for consciousness in the form of *being* or *immediacy*, is the object as still *unmediated*, as merely *given*, and consciousness is equally unmediated in its relation to it. The moment of that infinite judgement is the transition of *immediacy* into mediation, or *negativity*. The given object is consequently determined as a negative object; consciousness, however, is determined as *self-consciousness* over against it; in other words, the category which, in the course of observation, has run through the form of *being* is now posited in the form of being-for-self: consciousness no longer aims to *find* itself *immediately* but to produce itself by its own activity. It is *itself* the End at which its action aims, whereas in its role of observer it was concerned only with things. (PhS §344; PhG p. 191)

In “Consciousness,” the category of being was considered in its immediacy as something “merely *given*.” Natural consciousness ascribed ontological priority to the object. But then in the course of the dialectic this proved to be inadequate and eventually led us to the dialectic of “Self-Consciousness” where the object was considered to be something negative and inessential over and against the self-conscious subject. In the passage cited above, Hegel then immediately shifts over to a description of the movement of “Reason,” indicating that the movement from “Consciousness” to “Self-Consciousness”

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<sup>32</sup> Esp. PhS §348; PhG p. 193.

corresponds to the movement in “Reason” from “Observing Reason” to “The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through Its Own Activity.” As he puts it, “Observing Reason” has just run through the dialectical movement that corresponds to the simple “form of being.” Now, however, the moment of negation or otherness is introduced as in “Self-Consciousness.” At this point, we will see different forms of the individual self-conscious subject in its attempt to determine itself by distinguishing itself from others. Just as in the “Consciousness” chapter, so too in “Observing Reason” the conscious subject “was concerned only with things.” Now we will, as in “Self-Consciousness,” be concerned with the sphere of the self-conscious subject.

This supposition is confirmed when we analyze the place and role of this section in the *Phenomenology* as a whole. Since, as we have seen, the individual sections of “Observing Reason” run parallel to the sections in the “Consciousness” chapter, we can infer that the analyses of the present section, following “Observing Reason” as they do, must then correspond to the individual sections of “Self-Consciousness.”<sup>33</sup> Hegel confirms this structure rather straightforwardly at the beginning of the present section when he writes, “Just as Reason, in the role of observer, repeated, in the element of the category, the movement of *consciousness*, viz. sense-certainty, perception, and the Understanding, so will Reason again run through the double movement of self-consciousness, and pass over from independence into its freedom” (PhS §348; PhG p. 193). Here by “Reason, in the role of observer,” it is clear that Hegel means to refer to the section “Observing Reason” as a whole. In this passage he explicitly indicates once again that the three sections of “Observing Reason” correspond to the three sections of the “Consciousness” chapter. Then, referring implicitly to the present section, he says that Reason, just like self-consciousness, will “pass over from independence into its freedom.” Here Hegel indicates that the present section, “The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through Its Own Activity,” corresponds to the “Self-Consciousness” chapter which included first the “Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness,” (here referred to simply as “independence”), and the “Freedom of Self-Consciousness,” (here referred to as “its freedom”). Hegel’s formulation of the parallel structures here is particularly important. He tells us specifically that the sections run parallel to each other “in the element of the category.” By this he seems to mean that although the content of the various dialectical movements changes and gradually becomes richer, nevertheless with respect to the form of the dialectic, certain categorial elements remain the same and in fact are repeated at the various

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<sup>33</sup> See Hyppolite: “Ce que Hegel nomme ‘l’actualisation de la conscience de soi rationnelle par sa propre activité’ n’est pas autre chose que le développement répété de la conscience de soi dans l’élément de la raison.” “Structure de la *Phénoménologie*” in his *Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de l’esprit de Hegel*. Paris: Aubier, 1946, p. 65.

levels. Just as the categories from the various stages of “Consciousness” were repeated in “Observing Reason,” so also now we will expect to see the categories and forms of consciousness examined in “Self-Consciousness” turn up once again in the present section. We can briefly sketch the outline of this part of the “Reason” chapter implied by Hegel’s remarks here as follows<sup>34</sup>:

**B. Self-Consciousness**

1. The Truth of Self-Certainty
2. Lordship and Bondage
3. Freedom of Self-Consciousness

**B. The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through its own Activity**

1. Pleasure and Necessity
2. The Law of the Heart and the Frenzy of Self-Conceit
3. Virtue and the Way of the World

The two units of “Consciousness” and “Self-Consciousness” thus form the basic structures first of the object sphere and then of the subject sphere, units which are repeated here at the level of “Reason.” Now the task of the “Reason” chapter is to unify the subject and the object and to overcome the various forms of dualism that have plagued the dialectic up until this point. Thus, the new forms of subject and object which appear here in the first two sections of “Reason” are subsequently unified in the third section.

*C. Individuality Which Takes Itself to be Real in and for Itself*


In this third and final section of the “Reason” chapter, self-consciousness finally comes to realize what we, the philosophical audience, have known all along, namely the unity of subject and object. What self-consciousness learns from “Virtue and the Way of the World” is that the world is not an evil, external other that stands in contradiction to the individual subject or the moral sphere: self-consciousness, “being now absolutely certain of its reality, no longer seeks only to realize itself as End in an antithesis to the reality which immediately confronts it” (PhS §394; PhG p. 214). On the contrary, the world is in harmony with the individual and allows him to fulfill his needs cooperatively with others.<sup>35</sup> The individual is now able to identify with the external sphere and to see himself in it by means of his work and activity. In this self-recognition in the world of objects, the various dualisms such as universal and particular come together. Here we have “the interfusion of *being-in-itself* and *being-for-itself*, of universal and individuality” (PhS §394;

<sup>34</sup> Kline also notes these parallelisms with a slightly different role given to the “Unhappy Consciousness.” The fundamental terms on which he bases these parallelisms are “action” and “passion.” Kline, George L. “The Dialectic of Action and Passion in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*,” *Review of Metaphysics*, (23), 1970, pp. 679–89.

<sup>35</sup> With this, the section, “Virtue and the Way of the World,” contains roughly the same argument that we find in the *Philosophy of Right* under the heading “The System of Needs,” PR §§189–208.

PhG p. 214). Self-consciousness, in viewing the world, implicitly views itself since it sees its own individuality expressed in the external sphere: “it starts afresh from *itself*, and is occupied not with an *other*, but with *itself*” (PhS §396; PhG p. 215).

In making this point about the closure of the dualisms explored heretofore, Hegel indicates the overall structure of the “Reason” chapter and simultaneously locates the present section with a reference to the first two sections that we have just discussed. He writes, “With this Notion of itself, therefore, self-consciousness has returned into itself out of those opposed determinations which the category had for it, and which characterized the relation of self-consciousness to the category in its observational [i.e. ‘Observing Reason’] and also active [i.e. ‘The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through its Own Activity’] roles” (PhS §395; PhG p. 215). Both of the two previous forms of consciousness represented “opposed determinations,” that is, subject-object Notions which posited an opposition or split. This interpretation can be represented by the following graph:



At first, in “Observing Reason” as in “Consciousness,” priority was given to the object sphere, and the subject was considered something secondary. Then in “The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through its Own Activity” as in “Self-Consciousness,” the individual self-conscious agent was

given priority, and the world stood opposed to it as something negative. Finally, here this dialectic seems to come to an end since the subject-object split is apparently overcome. It is clear that this final section, "Individuality which takes itself to be real in and for itself," is meant to form a third discrete unit which brings together the two preceding sections. Here in this third section, these two moments of in-itself and for-itself come together as the "real in and for itself," where there is no longer any opposition. Thus, this section forms the apex of the pyramid consisting of "Consciousness," "Self-Consciousness" and the sections in "Reason" which run parallel to them. This outline should be read starting from the lower left-hand corner where we begin the dialectic at the level of common sense and the dualisms contained therein. The road to Science is an ascending one which I have tried to indicate by vertically representing the sequence of moments of the in-itself, the for-itself and the in-and-for-itself. Finally, the lines with arrows are intended to represent the parallelisms that we have been following.

## V. Spirit

Let us first turn to the question of what, with respect to content, does the "Spirit" chapter add to the truth problematic. What is the status of the discussions found there *vis-à-vis* "Consciousness," "Self-Consciousness" and "Reason"? After the brief summary of the first three chapters discussed above, Hegel at the beginning of the "Spirit" chapter proceeds to answer just this question about the role of "Spirit" and to justify the rest of the work. In an important passage, he writes, referring to "Reason as Testing Laws," the third and final section of "Reason,"

This still *abstract* determination which constitutes the "matter in hand" itself is at first only spiritual essence, and its consciousness [only] a formal knowing of it, which busies itself with all kinds of content of the essence. This consciousness, as a particular individual, is still in fact distinct from substance, and either makes arbitrary laws or fancies that in simply knowing laws it possesses them in their own absolute nature. Or, looked at from the side of substance, this is spiritual essence that is in and for itself, but which is not yet *consciousness* of itself. But essence that is *in and for itself*, and which is at the same time actual as consciousness and aware of itself, this is *Spirit*. (PhS §438; PhG p. 238)

Here Hegel makes the distinction between the level of "Reason" and that of "Spirit." In "Reason" self-consciousness had only a "formal knowing" of spiritual essence. It was abstracted or alienated from its immediate ethical relations. As he says later, "Spirit is thus self-supporting, absolute, real being. All previous shapes of consciousness are abstract forms of it... This isolating of those moments *presupposes* Spirit itself and subsists therein" (PhS §440; PhG p. 239). In "Reason" an account of the community and the social whole was given, but this account was always abstract. It was never any particular community. Likewise, the account of self-consciousness was always abstract.

For instance, in the final two sections, “Reason as Lawgiver” and “Reason as Testing Laws,” we were not concerned with a particular human subject in a particular community, but rather with any rational moral agent at all. These abstracted analyses “presuppose” a concrete social and historical community from which they were originally abstracted. This then forms the next major step in the argument. Now in order to give an account of the Notion, we must include an account of concrete historical communities.

From this analysis we can see that the key point of “Spirit” is that it introduces history into the account of the self-development of the subject-object Notion.<sup>36</sup> In the literature on the *Phenomenology*, one of the traditional problems of the continuity of the text has been how to reconcile the epistemological analyses of the first three chapters with the account of history that we find here in “Spirit.” With the reading I am proposing, we can begin to make sense of this difficult transition by understanding the epistemological import of the historical figures which Hegel analyzes. In order to get beyond the formal account of ethical life examined in “Reason,” we need to examine concrete social situations, and this is only possible by an examination of particular historical communities. As Hegel says of Spirit in the “Absolute Knowing” chapter, “The movement of carrying forward the form of its [sc. Spirit’s] self-knowledge is the labor which it accomplishes as actual History” (PhS §803; PhG p. 430).<sup>37</sup> In “Spirit” the dialectic departs from the abstract account of the individual and the community found in “Reason” and moves through history, and this movement shapes the truth claims of peoples and historical periods in a way that the “Reason” chapter could not account for. Concerning the content of the “Spirit” chapter, Hegel writes, “These shapes, however, are distinguished from the previous ones by the fact that they are real Spirits, actualities in the strict meaning of the word, and instead of being shapes merely of consciousness, are shapes of a world” (PhS §441; PhG p. 240). We are now concerned with the actual historical development of communities or as he says “actualities in the strict meaning of the word.” In order to give an account of how communities mediate truth claims, we must first give an historical account of how that community developed and how it came to hold certain truths or values. Such an historical account is thus presupposed in any abstract account of the role of the community in the self-determination of truth claims.

The question that this explanation raises for us is how these real or historical forms of “Spirit” fit in with our analysis of the architectonic of the work given so far. The most obvious hint is that Hegel divides his abbreviated ver-


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<sup>36</sup> Cf. Labarrière’s account. Labarrière, Pierre-Jean, *Structures et mouvement dialectique dans la Phénoménologie de l’esprit de Hegel*. Paris: Aubier, 1968, pp. 221–31.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. also: “Only the totality of Spirit is in Time, and the ‘shapes,’ which are ‘shapes’ of the totality of *Spirit*, display themselves in a temporal succession” (PhS §679; PhG p. 365).



sion of world history here in the “Spirit” chapter into three major sections as follows: “A. The True Spirit. The Ethical Order,” “B. Self-Alienated Spirit. Culture,” and “C. Spirit That is Certain of Itself. Morality.” This would seem to imply a correspondence of “Spirit” with the three sections of “Reason” and their respective correspondents in “Consciousness” and “Self-Consciousness.” In other words, this would mean that “A. The True Spirit” corresponds to “Consciousness,” and “Observing Reason.” Similarly, “B. Self-Alienated Spirit” would then correspond to “Self-Consciousness” and “The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness Through its own Activity.” Finally, the third section, “C. Spirit that is Certain of Itself” would form the apex, corresponding to “Individuality which takes itself to be real in and for itself,” the third and final section of the “Reason” chapter. For the sake of simplicity we can graphically represent the parallelisms that are implied by this reading in the following fashion:



There are a number of important pieces of evidence that support this thesis about the parallel sections. Most obviously, this correspondence is indicated once again by the double Latin letters “BB.” of the “Spirit” chapter which are

intended to parallel the double letters “AA.” of “Reason.” In other words, “Spirit” will return to the beginning of the dialectic and will then go through all of the same stages as “Reason.” These two chapters run parallel to each other as wholes or complete units. This implies that the “Spirit” chapter will have *ipso facto* the same parallelisms with “Consciousness” and “Self-Consciousness” as the “Reason” chapter before it. Hegel indicates this parallelism explicitly in a couple of different places. For instance, in the “Religion” chapter he writes, “But the moments are *consciousness, self-consciousness, Reason, and Spirit–Spirit*, that is, as immediate Spirit, which is not yet consciousness of Spirit. Their totality, *taken together*, constitutes Spirit in its mundane existence generally; Spirit as such contains the previous structured shapes in universal determinations, in the moments just named” (PhS §679; PhG p. 365). Here it is clear that the dialectical movements that we have examined in the first three chapters repeat themselves again in “Spirit.” Here Hegel says unambiguously, “Spirit...contains the previous structured shapes.” The forms of consciousness in the first three chapters represent what Hegel here calls “universal determinations.” In other words, they constitute universal patterns of thought which can assume a number of different forms. These same universal forms are all contained in “Spirit” in their historical manifestations as Hegel indicates here. Third, these parallelisms are confirmed by the actual contents of the individual sections of the “Spirit” chapter.

The first section, “The True Spirit,” represents the in-itself moment of the dialectic. Here in the discussion of the *Antigone*, for instance, the ethical order is considered to be something objective. The ethical laws and principles are facts about the world that stand over and above all human opinions and authority. Hegel, citing the *Antigone*, writes of these ethical principles, “Thus, Sophocles’ *Antigone* acknowledges them as the unwritten and infallible law of the gods. ‘They are not of yesterday or today, but everlasting / Though where they come from, none of us can tell’” (PhS §437; PhG p. 236). The moral laws are ontological facts about the world according to this view. This then clearly corresponds to the realms of “Consciousness” and “Observing Reason” where priority is given to the object sphere at the expense of the subject. Hegel writes most explicitly, “Spirit, then is consciousness in general which embraces sense-certainty, perception, and the Understanding, in so far as in its self-analysis Spirit holds fast to the moment of being an objectively existent actuality to itself, and ignores the fact that this actuality is its own being-for-self” (PhS §440; PhG p. 239). From this passage it is, moreover, clear that the individual sections inside of these chapters and subsections also correspond to one another.

The second section of “Spirit,” “Self-Alienated Spirit,” represents the break and the move to the for-itself moment. Hegel indicates this when he writes, “If on the contrary, it [sc. Spirit] holds fast to the other moment of

the analysis, viz. that its object is its own *being-for-self*, then it is self-consciousness” (PhS §440; PhG p. 239). Here the historical subject, epitomized for Hegel by the nephew of Rameau in his alienation, rejects the accepted traditions and ethical order which were so important in the previous section. He accepts only his own ethical views as valid and negates those of the tradition, which he sees as contradictory or hypocritical. Here we can clearly recognize the for-itself aspect with its rejection of the objective sphere and its insistence on the truth and validity of the individual subject. This then corresponds to “Self-Consciousness” and the second section in “Reason.”

Finally, in the third section, “Spirit that is Certain of Itself,” the triad comes to a close with the in-and-for-itself moment. The dualisms of the two previous dialectics are at this point overcome. “Here, then,” Hegel writes, “knowledge appears at last to have become completely identical with its truth; for its truth is this very knowledge, and any antithesis between the two sides has vanished” (PhS §596; PhG p. 323). In this third section, the moment of alienation has been overcome and with it the dualism between the inner private law and the external world of nature or culture. In “The Moral View of the World,” for instance, nature is not an obstacle to morality; instead, it is thought to be conducive to moral life since obeying moral laws is thought to lead to happiness. Likewise, the beautiful soul’s appeal to conscience as the criterion for moral living unites the universally valid moral law with the individual. Thus, the third section represents the reconciliation of the two previous spheres. Hegel explains this as follows: “But as immediate consciousness of the being that is *in and for itself*, as unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, Spirit is consciousness that *has Reason*” (PhS §440; PhG p. 239). Thus, the historical forms of “Spirit” run through the same dialectical movements as the abstract forms of “Reason.” It now remains to be seen how the dialectic of “Religion” fits into this picture.

## VI. Religion

As we have seen, the movement of the dialectic in the *Phenomenology* tends to be one towards ever greater complexity. In “Consciousness,” the role of the self was unrecognized; in “Self-Consciousness” the role of the self as individual was all important; in “Reason” the role of the community was all important, and finally in “Spirit” the role of the historically changing community was essential. “Religion” likewise represents a more complex configuration than what we saw in the “Spirit” chapter. Here in “Religion” Spirit becomes aware of itself. This self-awareness is what Hegel calls “universal” or “absolute Spirit.”<sup>38</sup> “Spirit conceived as object,” Hegel writes, “has for itself the significance of being the universal Spirit that contains within itself all essence and all actuality” (PhS §677; PhG p. 364). This self-

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<sup>38</sup> PhS §682; PhG p. 368.


consciousness is implicitly implied in Spirit's awareness of its object sphere but must be made explicit in the course of the dialectic. Thus, "Religion" represents a further unpacking of the presuppositions implied in the subject-object Notion. In order to give an account of the Notion we must not just give an account of the development of the historical community. Necessarily implied in this development is the self-awareness of Spirit, which, for Hegel, comes about for the first time in "Religion," and specifically in "Revealed Religion." Spirit becomes self-aware in the revelation of God on earth in the Christian religion. Specifically, in Christ, Spirit becomes aware of itself. It sees that God and the absolute are not something otherworldly or different from man, but rather God is man or Spirit in the world.

Hegel indicates at the beginning of "Religion" that the parallelisms that we have been following up until now will continue in this chapter. He indicates that the forms of religion will correspond to the forms of the chapters we have examined so far: "If, therefore, religion is the perfection of Spirit into which its individual moments—consciousness, self-consciousness, Reason, and Spirit—return and have returned as into their ground, they together constitute the *existent* actuality of the totality of Spirit, which *is* only as the differentiating and self-returning movement of these aspects. The genesis of religion *in general* is contained in the movement of the universal moments" (PhS §680; PhG p. 366). In this extremely important passage, Hegel lays out for us in some measure the architectonic of the second half of the *Phenomenology*. He first repeats what we have already learned, namely that Spirit encompasses the previous forms and runs through them once again. Hegel then goes on to explain the role of the "Religion" chapter. He tells us that in contrast to the "Spirit" chapter, which ran through the various figures of consciousness in their historical or temporal forms, "Religion" will do the same atemporally:

The course traversed by these moments is, moreover, in relation to religion, not to be represented as occurring in Time. Only the totality of Spirit, is in Time, and the "shapes," which are "shapes" of the totality of *Spirit*, display themselves in a temporal succession; for only the whole has true actuality and therefore the form of pure freedom in face of an "other," a form which expresses itself as Time. But the *moments* of the whole, consciousness, self-consciousness, Reason, and Spirit, just because they are moments, have no existence in separation from one another. (PhS §679; PhG p. 365)

All of the previous forms are implicitly contained here in religion, and they all form a unitary whole which is represented by religion. This is what Hegel means when he says that they are moments which "have no existence in separation from one another." The various forms of consciousness are thus organically related and have their meaning only in their relation to the other moments. The conceptual movement of "Religion" thus corresponds to the fundamental structure constituted by the moments of "Consciousness," "Self-

Consciousness” and “Reason” which we have already seen. This information now helps us to complete our diagram as follows:



Throughout the “Religion” chapter itself, Hegel is quite forthcoming about the structure of the chapter, and we can thus find evidence in many places for the parallelisms indicated here.

That “Natural Religion” corresponds to “Consciousness” can be seen from the emphasis on the object sphere and above all from a number of explicit references. Here the divine is thought to dwell in the realm of objects. “The first reality of Spirit,” Hegel says, “is the Notion of religion itself, or religion as *immediate*, and therefore Natural Religion. In this, Spirit knows itself as its object in a natural or immediate shape” (PhS §683; PhG p. 368). Hegel confirms this parallelism when he declares that “God as Light,” the first section of “Natural Religion,” corresponds to the first section of the “Consciousness” chapter: “In the immediate, first diremption of self-knowing absolute Spirit its ‘shape’ has the determination which belongs to *immediate consciousness* or to *sense-certainty*” (PhS §686; PhG p. 371). Likewise, Hegel tells us that the second section, “Plant and Animal” corresponds to the second section of the “Consciousness” chapter, i.e. “Perception”: “Self-con-

scious Spirit that has withdrawn into itself from the shapeless essence, or has raised its immediacy to self in general, determines its unitary nature as a manifoldness of being-for-self, and is the religion of spiritual *perception*” (PhS §689; PhG p. 372). Finally the third form of natural religion, “The Artificer” corresponds in turn to the third section of the “Consciousness” chapter, namely “Force and Understanding.” Hegel tells us this explicitly when writes, “The first form, because it is immediate, is the abstract form of the Understanding, and the work is not yet in its own self filled with Spirit” (PhS §692; PhG p. 373).

The shift to the for-itself moment and to “Self-Consciousness” comes with “Religion in the Form of Art.” Here the divine is thought to be in the self-conscious subject as artist. Hegel introduces this section as follows: “The second reality, however, is necessarily that in which Spirit knows itself in the shape of a *superseded* natural existence, or of the self. This, therefore, is the Religion of Art; for the shape raises itself to the form of the self through the creative activity of consciousness whereby this beholds in its object its act or the self” (PhS §683; PhG p. 368). Here the emphasis is no longer on the natural entity as something given, but rather on self-consciousness’ re-shaping and reworking of it. In the artistic production, self-consciousness becomes aware of itself. Thus, the dialectic is thrown back to the subject sphere. Hegel confirms that this section corresponds to the transition to “Self-Consciousness” that we saw earlier in the dialectic: “The first work of art, as immediate, is abstract and individual. As for itself, it has to move away from this immediate and objective mode towards self-consciousness” (PhS §705; PhG p. 378).

The final section, “Revealed Religion,” forms the apex of the triad and represents the in-and-for-itself moment. It thus corresponds to the final third of the “Reason” and “Spirit” chapters respectively in which the dualisms and oppositions are overcome. Hegel tells us,

Finally, the third reality overcomes the one-sidedness of the first two; the self is just as much an immediacy, as the immediacy is the self. If, in the first reality, Spirit in general is in the form of consciousness, and in the second, in that of self-consciousness, in the third it is in the form of the unity of both. It has the shape of being-in-and-for-itself; and when it is thus conceived as it is in and for itself, this is the Revealed Religion. (PhS §683; PhG p. 368)

Here in “Revealed Religion” the subject-object split is overcome in the concept of revelation. In revelation man recognizes himself in God and through this recognition becomes reconciled with the world. This reconciliation comes about in the revealed religion, i.e. in Christianity, where God is revealed on earth as man. Here God is no longer something transcendent and otherworldly but, instead, is a particular man living in this world. This account contains, on Hegel’s view, a deep metaphysical truth expressed in

terms of a story. The truth of subject-object unity and the individual self-awareness is expressed by the Christian account of God as revealed. Philosophical or scientific thinking in its turn understands this same truth in a different way.

## VII. Absolute Knowing

Hegel claims that “Religion” has the same content as philosophical knowing, i.e. Absolute Knowing, but that it understands it in a different way, namely, metaphorically.<sup>39</sup> He says that at the moment of “Religion,” “Spirit itself as a whole, and the self-differentiated moments within it, fall within the sphere of picture-thinking and in the form of objectivity. The *content* of this picture-thinking is absolute Spirit” (PhS §788; PhG p. 422). Hegel expresses this more straightforwardly in the *Encyclopaedia Logic*: “The objects of philosophy, it is true, are upon the whole the same as those of religion” (EL §1; Enz p. 27).<sup>40</sup> What these passages tell us is that, for Hegel, the content that the dialectic has reached in “Religion” is the same as in “Absolute Knowing.”<sup>41</sup> Thus, by the time we reach “Religion” the content of our account of the self-determination of truth is complete and exhaustive. This would mean that in a sense our story of the determination of subject and object ends with the “Religion” chapter<sup>42</sup> since at that point a complete account has been given. The upshot of this account was to show the ultimate unity of all the various factors, at first thought to be unrelated, in the overall truth process. We thus see the great unity and interconnectedness of the subject with the object, of the subject with the community, of the community with other historically related communities, in short of everything with everything else in the broadest sense. Hegel explains this as follows:

Thus the object is in part *immediate* being or, in general a Thing—corresponding to immediate consciousness; in part, an othering of itself, its relationship or *being-for-an-other*, and *being-for-itself*, i.e. determinateness—corresponding to perception; and in part *essence*, or in the form of a universal—corresponding to the Understanding....it is from one side a shape

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<sup>39</sup> Cf. Lauer, Quentin S. J., “Hegel on the Identity of Content in Religion and Philosophy,” in *Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion*, edited by Darrel E. Christensen. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, pp. 261–78.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. “The content of religion is absolute truth, and consequently the religious is the most sublime of all dispositions” (PR §270 Remark; RP p. 349).

<sup>41</sup> Cf. “The content of religion proclaims earlier in time than does Science, what *Spirit is*, but only Science is its true knowledge of itself” (PhS §802; PhG p. 430).

<sup>42</sup> This interpretation is confirmed by Hegel’s announcement of the publication of the *Phenomenology* in which he clearly separates “Religion” from the other forms of consciousness and associates it with truth and science: “The *Phenomenology* contains within itself the various forms of Spirit as stations along the road by which it becomes pure knowing or Absolute Spirit....The ultimate truth is found at first in Religion and then in Science as the result of the whole.” Cited from Hoffmeister’s introduction in his edition of the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Hamburg: Meiner, 1952, XXXVIII. (My translation.)



of consciousness as such, and from the other side a number of such shapes which *we* bring together, in which the totality of the moments of the object and of the relation of consciousness to it can be indicated only as resolved into its moments. (PhS §789; PhG pp. 422–23)

The dialectic has shown us the totality of the interconnectedness of all forms of subject and object in the attempt to give a complete account of the subject-object Notion. The dialectic has thus demonstrated the truth of a certain sort of epistemic monism in which everything is necessarily related to the whole, and the whole thus corresponds to the ultimate account of the Notion. This is therefore the actual content that the dialectic has produced.

The question is now how to interpret this account of the monistic unity of the world. For Hegel, there are two possibilities: the religious interpretation and the philosophical interpretation. The religious interpretation understands this monistic truth with stories, symbols and metaphors or what has been translated as “picture-thinking.” In the figure of God, the religious interpretation personifies the great monistic unity of the universe. For the religious consciousness, these most abstract truths must thus be seen through the veil of simplified concrete examples drawn from normal human experience. The philosophical consciousness, on the other hand, sees these truths for what they are and is able to extricate them from their metaphorical form. Thus, although the monistic content of both interpretations is the same, the difference exists in how that content is understood. Hegel tells us in a fairly straightforward fashion in a number of different places that Absolute Knowing is merely the understanding of all of these previous modes of knowing in their conceptual form. For instance, he writes, “The realm of Spirits which is formed in this way in the outer world constitutes a succession in Time in which one Spirit relieved another of its charge and each took over the empire of the world from its predecessor. Their goal is the revelation of the depth of Spirit, and this is *the absolute Notion*” (PhS §808; PhG p. 433). The absolute Notion is thus the Notion which encompasses all other Notions within itself. It is the complete or exhaustive Notion. In other words, Absolute Knowing is the panoptic overview of all previous Notions.<sup>43</sup> Hegel thus makes clear that Absolute Knowing is not the knowing of any particular fact or ultimate piece of wisdom but rather it is merely the grasping of the various forms of thought as a whole. Here we find at the end of the *Phenomenology* a powerful statement of Hegel’s holism. Every individual truth or value must be understood in a larger context. Only with this overview of the complex network of interrelations of truth claims, individuals, institutions and

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<sup>43</sup> Cf. Pätzold, Detlev, “Das absolute Wissen als Theorie des Gesamtzusammenhangs,” *Annalen der Internationalen Gesellschaft für Dialektische Philosophie*, (1), 1983, pp. 33–37. Cunningham, G. W., “The Significance of the Hegelian Conception of Absolute Knowledge,” *Philosophical Review*, (17), 1908, pp. 619–42.

historical events are we able to come to understand the true nature of such claims and give a complete account of objectivity.

### VIII. The Philosophical Import of a Systematic Reading

Is there anything philosophically interesting that this interpretation of the architectonic of the *Phenomenology* as a whole brings with it, or are these parallelisms simply of interest to the despairing Hegel philologist trying to patch together the Hegelian system for its own sake?<sup>44</sup> The philosophically provocative point that these parallelisms implicitly indicate is that the conceptual logic that governs the development of the object-Notion and the subject-Notion is the same logic that governs world-historical forces. In other words, the moments of in-itself, for-itself and in-and-for-itself and the dialectic of universal and particular are not categories which apply only to a particular and limited subject matter; instead, they are universal categories or “universal determinations” which govern all human thought and which as such can be found in any subject matter. Thus, the logic which governs our understanding of a Notion of a particular, apparently isolated object is the same as that which governs our understanding of the various epoches of world history with their manifold interrelations and complexities. Precisely this point, which is essential for Hegel’s idealism and his monism, is overlooked when we analyze individual arguments of his philosophy in abstraction from their systematic context.

This analysis can by no means be seen as the final word on the systematic structure of the *Phenomenology*. Much work still remains to be done above all with respect to establishing the unity of the content of the work which I could only sketch here in the broadest of strokes. It remains to be seen, moreover, with respect to exactly which “categories” the various sections correspond to one another. This analysis, however, does show us that Hegel in fact had a systematic structure in mind when he wrote the book. One can always dispute the question concerning to what degree he adhered to this structure in any given analysis, but it would be absurd at this point to claim that such a structure simply does not exist. Moreover, we need not find Hegel’s structure here philosophically compelling in order to use it to understand the individual analyses which he gives. But, on the other hand, the risk that we run by ignoring his systematic pretensions entirely is not understanding him at all.

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<sup>44</sup> This is the reproach in Wim van Dooren’s review of Labarrière’s book. “Zwei Methoden, die *Phänomenologie des Geistes* zu interpretieren,” *Hegel-Studien*, (7), 1972, esp. p. 299.